Insights and Innovations in Community Mental Health

The Erich Lindemann Memorial Lectures

organized and edited by
The Erich Lindemann Memorial Lecture Committee

hosted by William James College

Table of Contents

Foreward 3

Coming to the Rescue or None of My Business: The Effect of Responding vs. Ignoring on Community Health 4

Michael Grodin, MD 5

Ervin Staub, PhD 12

Introduction by David G. Satin, MD 12

Ervin Staub, PhD 12

Kathleen M. O'Toole 20

Introduction David G. Satin, M.D 20

Kathleen M. O'Toole 20

Discussion 28

Foreward

The Erich Lindemann Memorial Lecture is a forum in which to address issues of community mental health, public health, and social policy. It is also a place to give a hearing to those working in these fields, and to encourage students and workers to pursue this perspective, even in times that do not emphasize the social and humane perspective. It's important that social and community psychiatry continue to be presented and encouraged to an audience increasingly unfamiliar with its origins and with Dr. Lindemann as a person. The lecturers and discussants have presented a wide range of clinical, policy, and historical topics that continue to have much to teach.

Here we make available lectures that were presented since 1988. They are still live issues that have not been solved or become less important. This teaches us the historical lesson that societal needs and problems are an existential part of the ongoing life of people, communities, and society. We adapt ways of coping with them that are more effective and more appropriate to changed circumstances—values, technology, and populations. The inisghts and suggested approaches are still appropriate and inspiring.

Another value of the Lectures is the process of addressing problems that they exemplify: A group agrees on the importance of an issue, seeks out those with experience, enthusiasm, and creativity, and brings them together to share their approaches and open themselves to cross-fertilization. This results in new ideas, approaches, and collaborations. It might be argued that this apparoach, characteristic of social psychiatry and community mental health, is more important for societal benefit than are specific new techniques.

We hope that readers will become interested, excited, and broadly educated. For a listing of all the Erich Lindemann Memorial Lectures, please visit www.williamjames.edu/lindemann.

The Erich Lindemann Memorial Lecture Committee presents

THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL
ERICH LINDEMANN MEMORIAL LECTURE

Coming to the Rescue or None of My Business: The Effect of Responding vs. Ignoring on Community Health

Who is our brother's keeper? What is the balance between caring for one another and protecting ones own against strangers? What is the impact of taking action vs. passivity, not only on those involved but also on the character of the community which they make up? This is the interface in which individual psychology and values accumulate into social psychiatry and psychology. This Lindemann Lecture explores this interface from psychological, historical, and public safety points of view, with implications for community mental health and, inevitably, social values.

Speakers

Ervin Staub, PhD, Professor of Psychology, University of Massachusetts, Amherst; Director of the PhD concentration in the Psychology of Peace and the Prevention of Violence

Michael Grodin, MD, Professor of Psychiatry, Socio-Medical Sciences, Community Medicine, Bioethics and Human Rights: Boston University Schools of Public Health and Medicine; Co-Founder of Global Lawyers and Physicians: Working Together for Human Rights; Co-Director of the Boston Center for Refugee Health and Human Rights: Caring for Survivors of Torture

Kathleen M. O'Toole, Commissioner of Police, City of Boston

Moderator

David G. Satin, MD, LFAPA, Assistant Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School; Chairman, Erich Lindemann Memorial Lecture Committee

Friday, May 20, 2005, 2:30 – 5:00 pm

Massachusetts School of Professional Psychology
221 Rivermoor Street, Boston, MA 02132

Michael Grodin, MD

Professor of Psychiatry, Socio-Medical Sciences, CommunityMedicine, Bioethics and Human Rights: Boston University Schools of Public Health and Medicine; Co-Founder of Global Lawyers and Physicians: Working Together for Human Rights; Co-Director of the Boston Center for Refugee Health and Human Rights: Caring for Survivors of Torture

First of all I'd like to thank the Lindemann family. It's a pleasure to be here with this discussion with the experts that we hopefully will have a very exciting and interesting dialog. When I started to put together this talk, which will be on the righteous gentile and what we know about the rescuers during the Holocaust, I realized it's really the culmination of my entire career at this moment in time. I have spent twenty-five years actually looking at the questions around the Holocaust amongst the other things that I do. But I will begin first of all with a disclosure, and that is that I come from a long line of rabbis. My father said that, had I studied properly, I wouldn't have had to go into medicine. But interestingly enough, I was at a conference recently with a rabbi who said his father said the same thing, that he probably could have been a doctor.

I spent an enormous amount of time worrying and thinking about the question of resiliency and perpetrators and rescuers. In the first part of my studies twenty-five years ago, was this book that I did when I was very interested in and concerned about survivors of trauma, resiliency, and suffering and it was very interesting how people got through these things, these horrible horrible acts. That was the first 5 or 6 years. Then the next topic that I was involved in was at the Psychoanalytical Institute. I began work where I presented a topic called, "Mad Dad and Evil: How Position Leaders Turn to Torture and Murder." I became every interested in how people, murders and what goes on, how the psychological process can really explain that. And now, for the third phase of my interest and involvement in this area, I am looking at the so-called bystanders or rescuers. I am going to set up a paradigm for how we look at that. Some of this draws on the work that I run a center for survivors of torture in Boston Medical Center, where we saw about 800 survivors of torture and refuges traveling from 56 countries over the last 4 years from Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, the former Yugoslavia, Tibet, from all over the world. And so I've learned a great deal in working with these clients.

I'm not going to do a whole history with you on the Holocaust, but first let me start off by giving a historical context. The idea or question I have is, why do some people become rescuers and others do not? Which is a radical, sound question. We have to put it first in a historical context. The destruction of the European Jewish community took many, many steps. There are individuals and groups that had opportunities at many, many junctures to harm, to participate in acts of perpetrator. To remain bystanders and we'll see in a minute that there's really no such thing as a bystander. Willing to actually

help and to rescue and I'm interested in the rescue part. Everybody had choices to make and no one was without a position.

The key I think was that people had to really see the Jews as other, as something other than themselves, as something sub-human, as outside of the community and I think that's going to be very important in terms of the rescuers and how they saw themselves. Between 1933 and 1939, there was a purge of German Jews from social, cultural, and economic life. This was done through legal means, through violence, through propaganda. The Newenberg Citizenship laws established Jews as outside of the main. The Crystal Broth in 1938 was really the night of broken glass began the physical removal of Jews for citizenship. There was actually a code of exclusion from public life. And then of course, 1939 France declared war in Germany and World War II begins. This is sly from Crystal Noth. This continues as a prelude to the extermination with the establishment of the ghettos. The ghettos were set up with more death and torture, mass shootings in the Soviet zone, house-to-house searches, and ultimately the construction of Ulstrich boot camp and the concentration camps. So, for those of you who are interested in that, my book on the nazi doctors goes through an extensive, long discussion of the eugenics movements, the medical doctors involvement, and how it began with the sterililization program, moved to the euthanasia program, and some of the physicians and nurses took down the gas chambers and mental patients and moved them to Poland and were actually involved in the killing, you become healing and then killing.

The medicalization, if you will, of the final solution. In January of 1942, the Wetzel Conference, the Final Solution is discussed and the war finally comes to an end with over six million Jews killed. The Final Solution is a long and complicated discussion, which obviously depended on cooperation, or at least passivity of non-Jews. There was medicalization, as I suggested before, a social dominance notion, that the Jews were the poison, the sick appendix that needed to be removed. Germany was seen as a vibrant organism and there was a need to cure that organism through murder and genocide. Eugenics was a major part of it. Jews were seen as germs, as parasites. The German float was considered to be an organism, through ethnic cleansing the infection was rooted out and Jews were ultimately genocide. It's important though to place the Jews, the gypsies the others outside of the world, community, outside the boundaries of moral obligation. The objectification of the other, again the medicalization, the Nazi ideology. The physicians needed the Nazis, the Nazis needed the physicians to carry out their activities outside the moral frame of reference. But, the continuum of choice as I suggested is first of all, one of the traits of adding harm, of being a perpetrator in self, which we're not going to focus on today. There is the continuum of doing nothing, or those who actually prevented harm, who actually went out and rescued. And I would like to draw on the typology of David Gussy again by dividing the groups up into perpetrators, informants, bystanders, and rescuers. And what I'd really like to focus on is what we know about

rescuers, what was the context, what made people put their lives at risk to rescue people that they didn't know?

So first we'll start off with perpetrators, which I'm not going to focus on a great deal but this obviously had direct involvement, they were not just passively involved but actually directly involved. And the question of course is whether the perpetrators were as I like to say, mad, bad, or evil? What was the contact of the perpetrators? And from my work on perpetrators, and Professor Staub is really an expert on this so we'll leave it to him. But my work on interviewing some perpetrators, Nazi physicians in Germany, as well as interviewing others in Greece and some Cambodians from the Khmer Rouge, is that these are primarily not people with mental illness who are involved in perpetrators. People who have mental illness are not controllable enough, they have to have enough ego-structure to be able to carry out these acts. And what happened is that people are put into a closed environment, they're taken outside of the realm of normal society and create their own kind of club, it's like how gangs work.

They create their own language, their own sense of self and the abnormal becomes the normal, the standard of what the perpetrator carries out t their actions. Perpetrators were involved in uniform. Fifty percent of all physicians in the Nazi party hired in any other group. Again, this medicalization of killing. But the uniformed were the direct killers, the military security, the key-four program for Euthanasia and the non-uniformed Nazi, the Germans who were involved as bounty hunters, or freelance perpetrators. But all of these groups saw themselves as special. They formed their own bond, they isolate themselves and they were involved in the direct perpetrator activity. They need to see the other as something different from the self. The perpetrators also used the exploitation of ethnic traditions, exploited a lot of the history of ethnic traditions against the Jews, the anti-Semitism. Significant amount of killing was done by uniformed and non-uniformed police officers and other people in the society.

The encouragement of anti-Jewish acts and inflammatory propaganda legitimizes and encourages anti-Semitic acts. Also, particularly taking Jewish property, Jewish homes, jobs, etc., and that should be distinguished from the thieves who often gained things from their activity. Informants worked with the killers , the non-uniformed professionals and local informants, blackmailers, con artists, and this was all part of their activity in terms of the Holocaust. The third category is the bystanders. As I've spent many an hour talking with my colleague Ellie Rosar at B.U. about how humans become killers. He's very much made it clear to me that there's no such thing as a bystander. That everybody has a place and everybody makes a decision. Bystanders are people who did not harm, but they did not help either. Their in-action was a task of cooperation, and as many people have said, the opposite of good is indifference, not necessarily evil in of itself.

But what I want to focus on in the short time that I have is really the rescuers. And we wanted to flag up the rescuers into two groups, one was so-called the reward-

rescuers. These were people who rescued but for money or for reward or some other positive gain and we'll see when we talk about the righteous gentiles, which is what I'm going to talk about. These people were excluded from that category because of the monetary gain or whatever it was that they got from their involvement in rescuing. The so-called righteous gentiles, selflessly, for no gain to themselves, risked their life and often their family in return, to save the Jews and those are the population that I'm interested in looking at. And what I call meta-analysis, which is that I looked at all the literature on rescuers to see what we could learn. There are several very well-known authors and what I've done is that I've put together what's known from all those people who studied rescuers to try to understand why they carried out what they carried out.

Just to give you a background, when we look at the predictors of who's a rescuer. Far less than 1% of the population was involved in this activity. Okay, so it's going to be hard to make statistical significant generalizations, but we're going to try. The other thing is that in all of the studies suggest that somehow, there was an inability to place Jews outside of their moral obligations, or to see them as the other, like what the perpetrators needed to do. So, what I'd like to do is short period of time is to go through this large literature and try to pull it together. And the question I'm asking is what factors determine who was rescuer? What factors determine who was a rescuer because if perhaps we can learn that that perhaps we can use that information in some way. So, first of all I'm going to look at the socialization of the rescuers, the conditions of the rescuers themselves, of their childhood, their upbringing, and what relationship their was between those socialization factors and those who predicted that they would be a rescuer and would not be a rescuer.

First, we're going to look at parent-child relationships. And generally, the rescuers seemed to have closer parent-child relationships, a warm and nurturing kind of environment and what we're going to is that it's not predictable. In other words, although there's a tendency towards this kind of stronger, it doesn't predict who will rescue and who won't rescue. The second factor of socialization, discipline at home. It appears that less physical punishment and more reasoning in those rescuers in terms of family upbringing, we'll focus on consequences of behavior to others was stressed. Again, it's not predictable who was a rescuer and who wasn't- it's not significant. What about role-modeling? Or parents who are more altruistic? There's a tendency towards that but there's not significance as to who was a rescuer and who wasn't a rescuer. Content of moral structure, generally are families a little more tolerant of self-reliance, inclusiveness, and independence, but it was not statistically significant. Childhood loss. You might think that those that encountered suffering or grief might be more sensitive towards but it turns out that that was not the case, but what can we conclude about the factors of socialization of the rescuers, is that socialization is not necessary but also sufficient.

There is a tendency to the notion of nurturing and altruism, but that in and of itself is not a promise of altruistic behavior. Professor Straub will talk more about this later. I understand he's doing some work on altruism, but it doesn't guarantee someone who won't be a rescuer or who will be a rescuer. It's kind of counter-intuitive to me why this is, because I would have thought there would be a much more correlation. This is one of the rescuers by the way, who saved hundreds and hundreds of Jews, putting your life at risk for no reason. I'll go over it later.

Sociological variables; age, rescuers tended to be older but again, not statistically significant. Gender- more men than women, and in some studies, more women then men. No correlation. Occupation and social class, not significant. Politics, all political parties were represented for those who were rescuers. Representing slightly more to people who are Democratic, but it was not statistically significant. A very interesting one, religion. I would have thought that might be an indicator, the more religious you are. There was little significance among who was a rescuer by religious commitment, either by what religion you were or what religious commitment you have. Conclusion: There is no significant predictor to who is a rescuer based on sociological variables.

Situational factors, to see if those relate to who's a rescuer or not a rescuer. Knowledge- rescuers have a tendency to have more friends, neighbors or co-workers who are Jewish, but there was a little difference in comprehension about what was happening to the Jews and there was not a good correlation between those who had relationships with Jews in terms of who was a rescuer or not a rescuer. Again, counter-intuitive. Risks- the risks of being caught varied by location and family. There was no difference between rescuers and non-rescuers. Rescuers were aware of the risks and were afraid, they persevered and there was no correlation. Resources- the community, some communities who were available for support or were aware of other families but it was not significant. An opportunity. An opportunity to rescue. There was no significance between the rescuers and non-rescuers. Conclusion: no significant variables come out as to who will be a rescuer and who will not.

Personality traits, very interesting. They looked at things like adventurous, people who go out of their way to rescue. There is some correlation between people who like to take risks and courage but not significant. There's a pattern here. Social march anailty- no significance. Social responsibility and empathy- generally people with a stronger sense of responsibility to help others, most describe actions to help Jews as unremarkable and natural, that anyone would have done. That's an interesting quote. If you go out and look at the rescuers, most of them didn't see what they did as special. They all said that they just did it. I'll come back to that when I get to the conclusions, very soon as to what I think explains, if it's possible why these people did what they did. Self-esteem and independence was higher in the rescuers but compassion is a crime punishable by death, then ordinary acts of kindness become extraordinary and there was

no specific correlation. Conclusion: there was no significant differences in separating or concluding who would be a rescuer and who would not be a rescuer.

Motives of the rescue. So the question of whether the rescuer has personal ties with the Jews. You would think there would be a higher rate of rescues. 90% of rescuers also helped at least one stranger so again, there's no correlation. Inter-group ties. Jewish converts to Christianity and partners of mixed marriages, etc., were not significant. Reference group incidents. Communities or towns or neighbors who rescued. No correlation. People who were in towns that nobody rescued and others that everybody rescued. Patriotic and political ideologies; you'd think that those who had a particular hatred for the Nazis might be rescuers. No correlation. Religion. Few sited religion as their motivation for doing their rescue. Humanitarian motives. Some have inclusive moral principles and commitments to human rights and were emotionally empathetic but it was not a predictor. Conclusion: there was no significant predictor of who was a rescuer and who was not a rescuer.

Well, I'm just asking questions. I'm leaving it up to my colleagues to answer them here. But this is my conclusion after reviewing the world's literature on rescuers of the Holocaust. And that is, there is little evidence that rescuers acted as an action in a circumstance because of motive or sociological, situational, or personality characteristics. The motives ranged all over the spectrum and of course the conclusion would be that there are many paths to rescuing. The question is why and I put some tentative thoughts that I think. Some of the perpetrators who identified with the Nazis, but it seemed to me the question of whether we all have the potential for being perpetrators. But one of the keys to perpetrators was that they required some de-identification, dehumanization, the ability to see the other as something other than themselves to see the other. Some were perpetrators during the Holocaust, most were bystanders as I suggested, indifference is the ultimate evil. And some were heroes and the question is why is that?

Most people who were heroes or saw themselves as heroes are quite different than the rescuers. The rescuers really didn't see themselves as heroes so there weren't rescuers who thought that they were doing heroic things and often times, I think they have kind of narcissistic, grandiose ideas. Hopefully, there is a culture of humanity and dignity. But most of the righteous gentiles did not see themselves as heroes. They saw themselves as regular people. I have a thought that they have identified themselves as somewhat idealized object relations. Most of them had, and this is the theme that doesn't come up in the studies but most of them had some idealization, some internal object. And what I think that it was not so much as what they did, what they needed to do, but that they couldn't live with themselves with what they didn't do, what they set out to do. They didn't see themselves as heroes but over and over again they said, "How could I not do it?" and the problem was is that they saw themselves in the other, they confronted themselves, they needed to do this in order to maintain their sense of integrity. This is

the garden for the rescuers. And then as a last point I'll stop is of course, what would you have done in those same situations? Pretty profound question.

Ervin Staub, PhD

Professor of Psychology, University of Massachusetts, Amherst; Director of the Ph.D. concentration in the Psychology of Peace and Prevention of Violence

Introduction by David G. Satin, MD

Thank you Dr. Grodin. A good tour de force of history, or at least this history. I'm sure you could have gone back further in terms of perpetrators and rescuers in times when people were being victimized. I'm afraid this is a constant factor in human history. I guess what I come away with from your talk is that it's a matter of moral values, whatever that means. Whatever you get that from. Somebody, somehow feels like this is the right thing to do and you can't do otherwise. That's a characteristic of moral values. It's not something you argue over, it's something you feel as being right, as being eternal. Other factor, other issue that you bring up is what would you do? What would we do? And I've had lots of thoughts, lots of debates with my wife and other people about whether everybody ought to have the obligation to do the right thing. Or whether it is very difficult to do the right thing when it's contradictory to what is going on around you, to the social pressure around you, or the political or legal pressures and dangers around you. How much responsibility does each of us have to do the right thing? Versus this is an unusual or heroic thing to do under difficult circumstances.

Dr. Grobin referred several times to Dr. Staub, who is a professor of Psychology at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. He studied health and behavior and altruism and passivity in the face of others needs. He is the author again, among other things of "Positive Social Behavior and Morality," "Social and Moral Values Individual and Societal Perspectives," "The Roots of Evil," "The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence," and finally "The Psychology of Good and Evil: Why Children, Adults, and Others Help and Harm Others." He's past President for the Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict and Violence.

Ervin Staub, PhD

Thank you very much. Thank you. I have spent many years studying what leads people to help others and what leads people to harm others. Originally, I was very interested in helping behavior, caring and altruism, then I became interested in violence and especially the incredible, unbelievable, horrendous violence of genocide. I'm asking, how can those things happen? I was interested in understanding the roots of it so we can then find ways to prevent it. I've become very interested reconciliation. In the last few years, I've been working in Rwanda for the last 6.5 years. I'm trying to promote healing and reconciliation to prevent new violence. A central strength in all this work is my interest and concern with the bystanders, and the bystanders are all of us. We are bystanders to a tremendous range of events. I define a bystander as a witness who's in a

position to know what's happening and can take action. Now I say in a position to know because bystanders often are very skillful in turning away and not seeing what's happening in front of them. Not noticing or engaging in internal psychological maneuvers to move away from it.

Let me give you an example. Many years ago, when a was a mere youth and I conducted a study, I was at Harvard and conducted a study in Cambridge, Massachusetts on the street. I had a young Harvard student collapse in the street and doing acts of different things, grabbing his knee, grabbing his heart. The student who was collapsing was on the same side of the street as a passerby, on the other side of the street from the passerby on another street, and when a person came on the other side of the street, there was a certain percentage who took a single look at this person who collapsed and immediately turned away, never looked back and some of them on the next corner, turned and looked in the opposite direction. It seemed to me that this person was avoiding taking in enough information about what was happening because if he or she had looked enough, the feeling of obligation to do something would have evolved and we sometimes want to avoid even that. I have studied bystanders fairly intensely in a number of different situations.

One kind of situation is the kind of situation I just described, people who witness a person in physical distress due to an accident, illness, or for other reasons or someone in psychological distress, a very different kind of situation but it can also be very impactful and the person can be in very great need. Heroic rescuers, people who endanger their lives in order to help someone who is in danger. Heroic rescuers, I have not studied directly. I have studied the literature on them, studied various things related to it, but I have not studied heroic rescuers directly. I have studied genocide, the evolution of genocide, the influences leading to genocide, and the rule of the passive relation that's not part of the perpetrator group who is the country and who often remains. Well I shouldn't say often because almost always, remains passive in the face of what's happening. It's a kind of interesting phenomenon that as harmful actions evolve and intense and extreme violence such as genocide, such as mass killing, always evolve, they don't suddenly appear. Now sometimes, there is mass killing of a group of people and then for a period of years, nothing is happening. But there is a cultural memory of what happened that prepares people for new violence when conditions arise that give rise to the influence that move people to violence. There is that kind of evolution. Sometimes the evolution is more step-wise.

In Germany for example, there was a very long history of German anti-semitism and persecution at different times. The persecution was less before the first World War, an earlier historical period but even then, there was German political party and there were many Germans who were educating to revoke the rights of the Jews we had acquired over time. There was that kind of beginning and then once the Nazis started, then there was a continuity of all kinds of actions taken, withdrawing Jewish rights, getting Jews

out of the military and out of the government, taking away Jewish businesses and prepared people, the population for taking more direct action against the Jews. Violence evolves and everybody changes along the way. Perpetrators change along the way, the passerbys change along the way. It's not possible to observe the suffering of other people, to be a witness to it, to continue to see this, to even have the sense that this going to continue, and take no action and to continue to feel caring, empathic, and concerned because it creates too much pain in us, empathetic suffering on our part.

So when people remain passive in such situations, we begin to remove ourselves from those who suffer. Their empathy diminishes, they distance themselves, they begin to do some of the stuff the perpetrators do, which is increasingly devalue those who are being harmed. Now it's not only people within the country who remain passive but very frequently outside groups and outside nations remain passive. If you look at the history of mass-killings, genocide, it's the extremely rare case that any action is taken. One of the unusual cases was Bosnia, after three or four years of violence and mass-violence, ethnic cleansing and mass-killing. I don't consider it a genocide but I do consider it a mass killing. After 3 or 4 years of this, the international community finally took sufficient action to stop. And then we also acted in Kosovo because the international community is so unaccustomed to action, when we act sometimes, we act in ways that's really harmful, rather than in ways that are more constructive. Once we finally acted in Kosavo, after long passivity there too, it was an extremely intense action, creating damage, including the loss of life.

For Rwanda, where I worked, there was an extreme, almost unbelievable example of passivity among the international community. I don't have time to go into that now because I have too many things to talk about but many of you may know this story of how extreme the passivity was. Okay, other examples of situations in which people are often bystanders. Parents abusing their children, physically or sexually. Now my clinician colleagues tell me that people who were sexually abused as children, often have as their most painful experience, the belief or the real knowledge that somebody knew about this and took no action. It is actually the case that there is not enough good research on this but there is quite a bit of anecdotal, descriptive evidence that sometimes a daughter is sexually abused by the father, is close to the mother, and the mother doesn't want to hear about it. So often, perpetrators act in the contact of complicity and I will return to that.

Adults abusing each other. Police officers using unnecessary force. You all remember the Rodney King incident, well not all of you because some of you may be young, too young to remember those videos but a couple of police officers were beating Rodney King and a while a whole group of other police officers were standing around. After that, I was asked to prepare a program for the state of California to use unnecessary force by the police and this program focused on the role of the police officers who watched in the street. There is usually police officers work in teams. They go off in team sand when one

officer gets emotionally aroused and gets angry and begins to act in ways that is potentially leading to violence, the tendency in certain police units is to always support each other no matter what. So at least joining or at least accepting what other police officer is doing is acceptable, right behavior. But actually, it is bad for everybody. It is not only bad for the person who becomes a victim of unnecessary force but it is also bad for the police officer who's engaging in violence because ultimately, sometimes police officers get into little trouble because of that and it can also be bad for the person who is standing passively by so the point of entry is to reinterpret this whole situation to see a police officer try to enter into their situation in some constructive way, as positive teamwork and as something that benefits that police officer, the citizen, the police force and the whole community.

So the passivity is extreme, I talked about that in the case of the genocide. Some people are perpetrators, there are many different levels of perpetrators, communicators, all of the things people are beginning to study is how genocide takes place in the local level. You understand something more about the national or leadership, or high level. There are individual perpetrators that are in support of others but then there are a lot of bystanders. And bystanders, that's a very large category. What are bystanders? Often people go on and engage in actions that support the system that is perpetrating the lives. So in Germany, most of the Germans stop going to Jewish stores, stop going to Jewish doctors, stop having Jewish lovers, and engaging with Jewish friends. And so in a sense, they become semi-active participants as I call them in my book, "The Roots of Evil."

What's the impact of passivity? Non-questionable, it encourages perpetrators who took passivity as acceptance, or even approval. Grobos wrote in his diary after every conference in 1938, when the community of nations gathered in Switzerland to talk about taking in Jewish refugees from Germany and nobody wanted the Jewish refugees. And he wrote, "They would all like to do with the Jews what we are doing but they don't have the courage to do it." This is not unusual, the passivity of bystanders encourages perpetrators. I think this is the norm, this is common. Passivity allows this evolution. Without bystanders, the population of outsiders speaking out, who knows what would have happened if when Yugoslavia had had Croatia as it was trying to become a separate country if Clinton, and Presidents of neighboring countries and prime ministers of neighboring countries have gone to Baghdad and say, "This is not going to stand. We're not going to stand for it." How can we support you? What is it that you need? Both saying "no" and also saying "Yes, we want to work with you to resolve what you need resolved." But it doesn't happen. The change is vast and this is what I said, this makes subsequent actions by them less likely because they tend to devalue the victims more and they see the victims as people who are less deserving than them.

People who are victimized, when you are a member of a community and you feel connected to other people and then everybody abandons you, what happens to you when everybody abandons you? The tendency is to feel helpless. What can I do for myself

alone? The community encouraged by out of the country leadership and a government I think was in London and they encouraged the population not to accept Jewish property when the Germans took over Jewish property, not to do others things and the resist, and they began to rescue in a more group level. Rescue Jewish children and so on. Then more of the Jews themselves became active in resistance and rescue. So why are most of us passive? Well, some people haven't developed sympathy, empathy, caring for the other and that is one reason but it is just one reason. There are many people who develop caring and are not helpful. Uncertainty about the meaning of certain events. In many situations, partly because of who one is. Some people, and again I don't have time to describe the experiments that show that some people who have uncertainty making decisions and when they see a wrongdoing, they don't report it because they are not sure. What does this mean? Did I really see what I am seeing? Circumstances are often ambiguous, sometimes they are clear. For example, someone is in distress and this person calls out for help. The likelihood of helping increases because we call out for help. People can say to themselves, and genuinely may feel uncertain "What's going on here?" " I don't know."

So dependence of getting help is supported by any ambiguity. People are concerned in emergency situations and I think appropriately. Now many years ago I taught for a year in Stanford and I asked, I described for the students a study the justifications of some people who didn't help saying that I was concerned, this may be inappropriate. And the large class of Stanford students said, "Yeah, that's right." You know? I will be concerned also. Wouldn't it be more right and shouldn't we socialize people to make the mistake to side with people who might need help and being sensitive to help. They make a mistake on the side of how badly the help is needed. There are often influences around us that define the meaning that represents more action is needed. One of the characteristics of genocide situations of mass killings is that there is a history of the devaluation of the other, which Dr. Grodin also talked about. A group of people in society who have long been seen in a negative way and the stronger the devaluation, the more these people are selected not just as "stupid" or "lazy," but morally bad and dangerous to us, the less likely it is that people will take action and usually perpetrating groups and governments, intensify these devaluations.

In Rwanda, hatred was intense, incredible, going on unbelievable inside of the population. We are actually, as part of our work in Rwanda are engaged in a very extensive radio project. We have two different radio programs going that is trying to do good work because that's the main means of communicating to the people in Rwanda is radio. One of the things that happens often in a genocide situation, is not only devaluation but often there are difficult life conditions. There are societal problems that are a starting point. They don't create intense violence but they are a starting point, which given other things complete the evolution. And one of them is an ideology, a vision

of a better life, a better world. And this vision can be a nationalist ideology or country or it can be like ideology in Cambodia where they will live in total social equality.

But then they decide all kinds of people as not being able to contribute to such a country or not even able or willing to live in such a country and this became the enemy and they turned against these people and they killed these people. So again, that's another influence that defines a group to be harmed. Another contributor to people being bystanders is a strong cultural respect and obedience to leaders. You don't deviate, you don't stand up, you don't speak up, you listen to leaders, you follow leaders. I used to think of the Unites States as a country where there is less of this talk, you know obedience to authorities were moderated. But another thing that happens, is not only a cultural characteristic, it is also something that is increased by certain circumstances and I think that after 9/11 where people were really affected and felt insecure and identity affected. You know, Americans think of themselves as this big, powerful country. How could this happen to us? What happened to our greatness and power and our importance? How could this happen to us? So under these circumstances also, the concept of authority becomes more intense. And I think that's one of the things that happened here in the United States. So, there are other influences but I'm going to move on.

What leads people to help? What leads people not to be passive bystanders? What leads people to take action? Well, one of them I believe is individual characteristics. Sympathy, poor social evaluation, but I'm really curious. I hope that what you described is available in some written form, I would like to look at it. I'm very curious about it. In my research in experiments, of studies that I have done where we measured some of these individual characteristics, they were related to people helping. Here in the United States, when you put people in a situation when you have somebody his sense of distrust in a room and then a person can go into that room and if you don't go into that room, then the person in that room comes in and asks for some kind of help. People who have more, what I call pro-social evaluation help more. Now, do I mean when I say pro-social evaluation, I mean a more positive evaluation of human beings and a feeling of personal responsibility to help other people. Circumstances have an influence. The extent to which for example circumstances focus on civility on someone. This diffuses responsibility.

A series of studies have found that when in some kind of situations, these are not situations of danger but situations when somebody needs help and when there are a number of people around, there is a confusion of responsibility. There's another thing that happens, people look at each other and everybody in America keeps a poker face in a public situation. They don't show concern. So you look around, you see nobody concerned so you decide there's nothing to be concerned by and people don't act to help. When a person is alone, proportionally, that person is more likely to help. In these non-dangerous situations that are emergencies. Now here is a proposal, a question, suggestion, I will come back to this later. In the face of horrible group action, many

people together are more likely to become active than bystanders. This is logical but there is limited evidence for this. This has not been studied in a particular way. Being asked for help, sometimes makes a difference as sometimes when I talk to and try to teach people about bystanders situations those about how to get people to help them when they need it and also about what tends to evoke help, asking makes a difference.

There was a study that I didn't know about and I'm curious about it but there is a study about 50% of the time, the person who was helped, asked for help. Asked directly or asked through an intermediate for help. I was once in Hawaii and I was body surfing and I body surfed on one part of the island and then I body surfed on another part that I didn't really know. It was later in the winter and there was these huge waves. I stepped into the water and I was so close to the shore that I didn't think I needed to duck under the wave. And I didn't and it took me out and threw me down and I broke some ribs. I was just lying there and people were walking by and nobody was doing anything. By that time I had done a series of studies on this. And so there was a person coming by and I looked at that person and I asked, "Please help?" She couldn't hear me because I was under by my waist and she looked at me, continued to walk, turned her head away, continued to walk and then turned back at me and I still continued to look at her and asked "Please help" and then she came in. And so asking for help is important.

What bystanders say to each other is extremely important. This is crucial, this is crucial. What bystanders say to each other is important. I have done a study in which two people sitting in the same room, one of them is a naïve participant in the study and the other is my confederate and there is a crash of something in the other room. And the person who is my confederate says one of several different things. This person say either, "That sounds bad, maybe we should do something?" I don't know what it is, maybe it's another experiment or it has nothing to do with this and in the most extreme things says, "That sounds bad, maybe we should do something? I'll go to the person in charge, you go into the other room." In the situation when the person minimizes what's going on, 25% of the participants helped. In the situation, the last one that I described, every single person goes into the other room to check on what's going on.

We have a powerful influence on each other. The group culture makes a difference. In certain circumstances, people were rescuers and not Europe because they were part of a group that had that norm. That had that standard. Now it's a double-edged sword. Some party's in-group in Poland believed in helping Jews and then they went out and helped and some participants believed in helping the Germans and not the Jews and so the culture of the group makes a difference. This is my last entry here. Now, those of us who are in this business talk a lot about the tremendous importance of all of us being active bystanders. Not standing passively by in the face of events, but we must recognize how difficult that is when the events are huge, societal events. How difficult it is even here in the United States, I mean you know, I won't hide my political orientation. After the elections, a group of us got together to talk about what happened and kind of support

each other and then we got together a couple more times talking about what this group can do because it's not enough to make ourselves feel better by licking our wounds and each others and being supportive to each other.

It's important to try and make a difference and create a moral society and a moral world we live in and a more peaceful, just world. And so, to focus even here, when we can't take action without our lives being endangered, is extremely important. So what's important first of all is for people to early action because even in things like genocide if people noticed early enough that there's a bad direction, taking action makes a very big difference. The perpetrators from the genocide don't know from the start usually in my opinion that they are going to create genocide. They evolve and exerting influence early on is tremendously important. And the other thing that is important is group support. People coming together, supporting each other, the evolution would happen in the United States, would go around, would work, pouted by rotten tomatoes, and bring up confidence that they were part of a like-minded group, even if they had no continuous contact with these people but knowing about them. So we have to figure out strategies and ways that in the face of difficult circumstances, people can join together to take action. Thank you very much.

Kathleen M. O'Toole

Commissioner of Police, City of Boston

Introduction David G. Satin, M.D.

Thank you Professor Staub. Two things I came away with are, three things rather, some times things are defined as not being evil, and sometimes things are defined as being necessary evil but I discern a moral sense behind all of this that people have a responsibility for responding. Kathleen O'Toole is a graduate from the Boston College and the New England School of Law. Has served twenty years in public safety and in 1989 served on the Independent Commission on policing in Northern Ireland. In 1994 she was appointed Massachusetts Secretary of Public Safety and since February 2004 has been Boston Police Commissioner. I'm anxious to hear how all of this has worked out on the streets of real life.

Kathleen M. O'Toole

Thank you very much. It's indeed a pleasure to be here and a special thanks to the Lindemann family. I'm humbled to be on this very distinguished panel. Of course I bring a very different perspective. It's a bit intimidating coming into a highly academic environment, in fact, I have to apologize because when trying to prepare slides at the eleventh hour. I haven't even had the chance to do some last minute edits so if there are any typographical errors, I promise my friends in the academic world here that I'll clean them up before they go to publication. Thank you very much.

I chuckled when I heard Dr. Grodin talk about his father the rabbi, it brought back memories of my mother when I announced that I was pursuing a career in policing. I'm a lawyer by education but decided to be a cop by trade and my mother was not at all enamored by the idea. In fact during my first several years in policing my mother friends ran into her on the streets and asked, "What's Kathleen doing?" My mother would say without hesitation, 'Kathleen's an attorney." She neglected to also mention that Kathleen was also a Boston cop and, fortunately, in later years she took credit for me.

It occurred to me as I listened to these very interesting presentations that over the course of twenty-six years of policing. I've seen lots of rescuers but I've also seen extreme passivity too, and many things in between. My presentations will probably prompt more questions than answers today, but I'll talk a little bit about the evolution of policing during my career and the paradigm shift that's occurred. I will focus on some of the challenges we're facing in terms of inner-city crime and how we're working with our communities and with others in government to deal with some of these challenges. I talk about placing life. I started on the job back in 1979 and went into a boot camp type environment in the police academy and it was really a power military environment. At that point we were trained to be the street fighters on the war on crime. It was really the

police versus the community. There were barriers then and we very seldom worked with the community to develop priorities or to listen to their concerns. We thought we knew what the concerns were and we would deal with them head on. While we worked hard and our hearts were in the right place, our crime rate continued to climb and life in the city continued to deteriorate.

So, obviously in the mid to late 80's we realized that we needed to change they way we did things dramatically. Rather than chasing 911 calls and being measured by crime statistics only, we decided to go out into the community and learn how to break down some of those barriers and determine how they wanted us to serve them. I really think that over the course of twenty-five years, there's been a huge paradigm shift interim of, especially here in Boston. Boston was one of the first police departments in this country and indeed the world to embrace the notion of whole-heartedly embracing the notion of community policing. So we like to say we were the first in the country, we were also the first in the country to embrace community policing.

We realized that rather than having enforcement as our number one priority, that prevention and intervention are our preference. We'd much rather now prevent a tragedy or crime from happening in the first place than responding after it occurred. So, thanks to some great grass roots community leaders and some forward thinking police managers, we have been able to break down many of the barriers. Is their room for improvement? Absolutely, there is a lot of room for improvement but we police an entirely different way than we used to twenty-five years ago. In order for our department to be credible, whether in Boston or in Belfast, Northern Ireland, we represent the community it serves in terms of race, gender, and ethnicity. We have to speak so many languages here in Boston and unless we effectively communicate with those people we serve, we'll be ineffective as a police organization.

We've dramatically changed our priorities in the way that we serve. We have a great international reputation for community policing and, as I said, the focus is on prevention, intervention, and enforcement is a last resort. I think of interest to many of you is the fact that we actually have 270 active community crime watch groups in Boston and community groups are so well-attended. It's so reassuring for me, especially as I go to many very, very difficult neighborhoods in the city and the greatest challenge and I see rooms filled, overflowing with people, standing room only, people who are willing to step up, taking responsibility in their own communities. So I guess many of them would fit the profile of the rescuers and they're at the very least responsible bystanders. So our current challenges is of violent crime, particularly in certain neighborhoods of the city and also in certain neighborhood, we're concerned about cultures and factors that discourage cooperation with the police. And the police definitely share responsibility and we'll talk a little bit about that going forward.

In terms of what's happening, we have had some very bold and tragic crimes in Boston over the last few years. Fortunately, when we look at it in terms of the big picture,

violent crimes continue to decline in the city but we've had an increase in relatively small in size but an increase in homicides. I hate to talk about homicides in terms of statistics because one is one too many; any one homicide is incredibly tragic. In terms of violent crime, we're doing okay but the tragedy is that 85% of our gun violence is limited to three neighborhoods in Boston. We have eleven district stations in Boston and this is a map of how they're broken down. But now I'll overlay the violent crime map and, as you can see, there are certain areas; Mattapan, Roxbury, and Dorchester are the neighborhoods most significantly impacted by violence and those are the neighborhoods we are trying focus a lot more resources and work effectively with the communities to develop solutions.

So as I said before, 85% of our gun violence is happening in these neighborhoods. Also, while we have had 21 homicides of gun violence this year, 19 of those homicides are clearly between people who know each other or people who are involved in gangs or drug activity. You know we have two homicides at this point, including the very tragic incident that happened in the Ronin Park area last week that were committed by individuals who didn't know their victims. Then we look at our community involvement. As I said, we have these 270 crime watch groups throughout the city and the green dots here signify where we have these crime watch groups. So we certainly have people who are interested and concerned, that have stepped up and are working with the police in these particular areas. But what these people take a huge risk in doing so because in their neighborhoods, there's a stigma with working with the police or people are concerned that if they communicate with the police and report crime they will be the victims of retaliation. So we need to create an environment, and we're working on that right now, that encourages greater community participation, greater responsibility but we need it to be safe environment for those who come forward to work with us.

As I said, some of challenges have been these more abrasive, violent crimes but they've been very challenging for investigators because it's been difficult to get people to come forward to help us. For instance, in 2002 a 10 year-old girl was killed in a Boston playground when she was caught in crossfire in a gang feud and the perpetrators were arrested. It was a very strong criminal case but the supporters for the defendants, including the mother of one of the defendants cousin, came to the court wearing these identical t-shirts with these slogan "Stop snitching." We had, last year, the Carter playground incident and the Ramsey Park incident; two bold, daylight shootings, crowded parks with hundreds of people and we couldn't get one witness to step forward and give us a description of the perpetrators.

In this horrible tragedy that happened just last week when John was murdered in front of his home by two young men, the investigators believe that the suspects live within a quarter of a mile of the attack, yet to date nobody has come forward with any information. But there's this culture of witness intimidation that we need to get beyond as a police agency. As I was in a community meeting in Meeting House hill area the other day an elderly woman stood up, she's lived in the neighborhood for many years, she was

very responsible, very articulate woman, she said, "Look, no one is going to tell you anything." We generally know who's possibly involved but there's a great fear of cooperating and mistrust with the police, coupled with fear of retaliation and this message is very powerful in communities that are the hardest hit by violence. We even have hip-hop songs and are dealing with rappers songs that lyrics that say stop snitching, even including the names of people they suspect as informant to the police.

So we're trying to focus on guns, gangs, and drugs but we're trying to do it in a way that goes just beyond enforcement and I'll show you today a few examples of projects we're working on that really focus on prevention and intervention. We're trying to change that culture of intimidation by reaching out to these and revitalizing our neighborhood crime watches and working with our law makers on creating laws that will enhance our witness protection capabilities. We have a great project going on, perhaps there are people in our audience that are helping us with this. It's a very collaborative initiative, it's called Comprehension Community Safety Initiative and a really interesting project. I brought some slides of it because I thought it would show you all the police departments working on in from a much more strategic perspective.

We used to go out and worry about neighborhoods and were try to focus on hot spots and seen to a greater extent, focusing on individuals. You know, we don't want to go out and just cast a wide net and harass innocent people or innocent kids who are standing on street corners. We want to focus on keeping players who are wreaking havoc on everyone but in every effort we've had in Boston, every successful effort, working with many agencies in the communities we serve to develop the strategies. So let me just give you one case study we've done and some good practical work that derived from it. It's part of this Comprehension Community Safety Initiative. We decided to look at the Grove Hall neighborhood in Boston, which is one of the most challenging neighborhoods for the police. There's been a significant crime rate there for many years but there's also a very active community. When I go into the Grove Hall library for instance for community meeting, there are hundreds of people there, good, decent people who are living in the midst of this who are desperately looking for answers.

We decided to take a much more strategic look at Grove Hall so we made a list. The police started working with probation and parole and other criminal law enforcement agencies making a list of all the people in Grove Hall who'd been arrested over a three-year period or had some significant interaction with the police. We wanted to determine what we knew about these people, what we needed to learn. At the end of the day after working with the three-year period, we came up with 457 individuals. That's only 2.4% of the population in Grove Hall which just goes to show that over 97% of the people living in this very challenging neighborhood are just good, decent people who are living in very difficult circumstances. But among these 457 individuals, they had generated nearly 12,000 arraignments in the criminal justice system in their lifetimes. The police always suspected that a very small percentage of the people were causing the lion's share of the

problem, and we were validated after we did this study. The police for too long worked in a insular environment and you know, we did our work but we had all these other agencies including Health and Human Services going along parallel tracks, but now we're trying to break down those barriers and build trust and we're working very closely Health and Human Services.

So we decided to take these 457 names and run them against the executive office of Health and Human Services database in Massachusetts and we yielded a 72% match. So obviously, the same people we are dealing with everyday in the police environment are the same people who are presenting cases and challenges for Health and Human Services. We are all obviously working towards the same end, which is better quality of life and safer neighborhoods. So I thought, we've changed the names to protect the innocent here but we decided to take those 457 names and we said, "Wow, this is interesting." You know, the police officers, all these people working together, you know there was a lot of the same surnames, or then people knew that there were relationships and cousins and growing up. Didn't we all know the family in our neighborhood, the family that was having the greatest challenges?

So we decided to look at one particular family in the Grove Hall neighborhood as part of this project. And we looked over them for more than 5 generations and we said "Let's look at the criminal justice indicators, but then all the social indicators you know after we determine that we have a lot of matches in the Health and Human Services databases." So this is this one family over five generations and we decided, let's look first at whosever been arrested. Well, needless to say, everyone who here in the orange has been arrested at one time or another. Who's been incarcerated? Well, again, we have the best information, the most reliable information on this last generation but anecdotally we've been able to fill in the blanks with some of the prior generations to show that this is activity that's being passed on to generation to generation. Now currently under supervision.

Now look at this last generation, I mean this is a generation that is growing up under DYS supervision. Gang involvement, again, some of these gang involvements go back into the 80's and the involvement of these gangs involve drugs and guns, but the behaviors has been passed on from generation to generation. Then, firearm offences either as victims, perpetrators, or both. Again, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon. I don't know if anyone's noticed a poor little Ursula over here in the corner, the twelve year old has some how survived without any significant action with the system; she's certainly been DSS involved. And domestic violence. We feel this has been very underreported given all the other activity in the family. Drug possession and distribution, again, possession and distribution in both.

So as the criminal justice indicators we relied on our friends at Social Services and Health and Social Services. Known education levels, needless to say, most of this last generation isn't in school anymore, they are in DYS involvement. As I said, this last

generation has pretty much gown up in their custody. Department of Social Services, similar. These are the mental health professionals who have been at the table trying to identify those members of the family who have diagnosable mental health needs. Known substance abuse. We think this is probably self-medication due to all of the trends we've seen on this family tree and other agency involvement. So, can you imagine the resources that are being focused on this one family? I mean right now there are seven, I'm sorry eight social workers working with different fractions of this family.

And then we have a very real case, this is a twelve-year-old victim, but there's one individual in this family in this last generation who been the target of gun fire five times now in the last several weeks. Obviously, he's survived so far but we're trying to figure out ways we can intervene so we will be bringing all the resources to the table, all these criminal justice agency and Health and Human Services to the table to develop strategies. I mean, this is a pilot program, and our biggest challenge is find out how we can scale this, but in these families we don't have people within who are capable of rescuing the family. As a community, we all need to come together and harness our resources and come together.

In this instance, Sean as you saw was a member of this last generation and Sean moved in with this woman who already had three children and they have two children as a result of this relationship. Well, even though he's only 7 or 8 years older than his girlfriends eldest son, he adopted him, not formally adopted him but now reports to be his step-father and he was actually recruiting Jason, age 12, to be the next shooter in the gang. So we knew Jason started to go off track, people in the public schools became aware of it, it was kind of a collaborative effort and we said, "How are we going to save this kid?" Because Jason, by the way is recognized as being a bright kid with great leadership tendencies. Well that could be a real problem if he ends up the next gang leader so we need to keep Jason on track and intervene to help him.

So we bring all of these resources to bare street workers, Department of Mental Health, Youth Violence Strike Force, youth services providers now work, in the Boston Police Force we now have a licensed clinical social worker in every police station to work with youth. We have 108 youth programs in Boston that we get involved in because we know that if we don't make an investment, if we don't try to intervene and prevent, we'll end up picking up the pieces of the tragedies occur. So obviously, this is a collaborative effort. We're doing some other things in terms of trying to get ahead of the curve. We bring all of the same players to our Street Violence Oppression meetings once every two weeks. We look at the patterns, we're able to use timely information to those similar to those charts I showed you earlier to determine where the hot spots are, where the problems are developing and to try to collaborate to intervene in these types of situations. So we're gathering information on a regular basis.

Another great intervention program we have going is this Operation Home Front and it starts in the school system. In fact the Boston Police Station received the number

one community policing aware in the country for Operation Home Front. We ask the schools to give us a head's up if they see a kid going off track and we develop and intervention strategy and we go into the home, the police joined by the clergy and social workers, whoever we think we need in a particular case we go into the home, meet with the parent or guardian. Whoever's responsible and try to ask them what we can do to be helpful. We put the kid on notice that we're watching but we try to bring resources to bare to help this family through this very difficult time. The Smith, I mean you saw, this family has huge issues, but they're still a family of people who love each other and are loyal to each other. So we try to build on that loyalty, that love, that caring that exists but try to intervene to prevent the next generation of violence. So we're working very closely with our faith-based partners and all the other agencies while mentioned earlier and hopefully we have lots of many rescuers among us.

As I said, we have 108 youth programs but trying to capitalize on this 97% of the community who are good, decent people who we're trying mobilize to work with us to keep these other kids on track who really don't have a chance unless there's some kind of outside intervention. And as I said, we need to change the culture of intimidation and hopefully some of the discussion here to today will discuss how we get people to overcome that intimidation and work closely with us. Our continued commitment to diversity I hope will help, because as we continue to emphasize our commitment to diversity whether it's through language certification, recruiting officers who are Cape Verdian, Haitian, Vietnamese, or Latino. We're trying to increase the numbers of those officers in our organization so we can more effectively communicate with those communities. It will enhance our credibility and we will understand the different cultures.

The crime watch, I'll pretty much finish up with this. We revitalizing our Crime Watch Initiative, as I said we have 270 groups out there right now. The average crime watch group has 25-30 people. At one time or another we've had up to 1,100 groups, similar groups in Boston. If we can revitalize these groups, we're talking well over 30,000 people who have demonstrated a commitment to working with the police. I think it's particularly difficult for people in tough neighborhoods where there is a culture of intimidation. What we're trying to do is work closely with the mayors' office and other departments in City Hall, we're thinking of broadening these crime watch groups so we don't call them "crime watch groups" anymore. We are talking about calling them "smart teams" as part of our Be Smart Initiative. But how people come into these groups where they talk about a wide array of neighborhood issues where they talk about quality of life issues as well as crime and it won't have this stigma coming to this meeting or community involvement only with the police.

It will be broader community involvement but the police can be there and hopefully establish greater lines of communication with people in the process. So, basically, our department has been in existence for over 235 years and we've made substantial gains

but most of the gains have definitely been through collaborative efforts. The police working with other public agencies such as non-profits, the private sector, and most importantly with the people we serve out there in our neighborhoods. The key challenge in mobilizing more resources to share responsibility and to try to rescue those people, the next generation who won't have a chance if we come together as a community to work for them. Thank you very much.

Discussion

David G. Satin:

I think that brings us down to earth. How do we apply the academics to real life situations? This to me is a turn-around, this situation. We were talking before about situations where the population was trying to fight against evil or authority and trying to fight against evil sub-groups within the population. Here we have heard last about the authorities trying not to be the passive bystanders, trying to do something about dealing with evil within the community and a community being divided between those who espouse crime, as one way of living and those who like not to have it but are being bound by the culture, being bound by threats, trying to be given some resources to react, to strengthen them in their reaction. I wonder if Dr. Rodin and Professor Staub can address what to do in the Boston area as being active, pro-active, responsible participants and not passive bystanders as helpless.

Ervin Staub:

Of course, we are here to give all the answers. First thing that comes to my mind is empowerment. We have done studies in which we look at the characteristics who help and the most important for orientation there is caring, but is much more likely to lead to action if a person feels something like, “I have the potential to actually influence others lives, so not only do I feel responsible but I can make a difference.” So my first thought was helping people to see what are the ways they have power, they have the ability to exert a positive influence I think makes a difference. There’s a lot more but I’ll stop.

Michael Grodin:

I want to make sure we hear from the audience, but how you get people to change behavior is a very, very difficult matter. There are three approaches and you kind of captured what I was saying. The most successful approach what one calls the rational-empirical approach which is when you show people statistics and you tell them, “This is the problem,” and people look at it and they say, “Oh yeah, that makes sense. We got to go out and stop this.” That never works, almost never works. But then the next approach is sort of normative, kind of the educative approach which kind of changes you, changes the norms. It changes what people see and what’s appropriate and what’s not appropriate and that takes time. Often you start out by giving people the data but then you have to change the norms.

Kathleen M. O’Toole:

Can I just make one comment here? I’d just like to say, some of the people who have been most helpful to us are prior offenders. We have a Boston re-entry initiative program right now where we work very closely with prisoners who will be coming back to there communities, to get the support systems they need and it’s usually the language skills,

job skills, substance abuse treatment. Most of our offenders come back to our neighborhoods and unless we help them through that process, you know it will be the revolving door. We have mentors who are prior offenders who have turned their lives around and their messages are far more powerful than anything that we as police can say, and I've been inspired by some of these incredible mentors who are great role models in their own communities right now who have really turned it around. Again it's tough, you know it's resources intensive to help these mentors turn their lives around so they can in turn be role models to others but it really has made a big difference, especially in some of these difficult, challenging communities.

David G. Satin:

That sounds like a stage in changing the norms. Showing people that something else is good, not what they used to think.

Ervin Staub:

Well the challenges here, and again very briefly, because I'm really interested in what the audience has to say. You were talking about possible alternatives for youth and that's extremely important, I think. There's a psychologist who has been working with our youth gangs a lot and one of the things he was trying to do is try to shift what a gang in engaged in. So rather than selling drugs, own washing machines, own laundries and have that kind of activity because it's a money-making activity and you can be really engaged in it. So these kinds of alternatives are very important, but the other thing is that it's clear from what you say that there is a change in the perception of the police and that's extremely important. You also seem to say that there are groups that it is very difficult to get them to trust police and then there is some kind of a campaign that is an informational campaign, a media campaign where you are pointing to the actions of the police and the actions the police are taking to try to benefit the community. And that it not any more an approach focusing on punishment, but it an approach focusing more on prevention. Now the police is really a friend of the community so using the media to try to communicate that to people, using people like prior offenders to try to communicate that I think can help, tremendous value, a lot of need.

Audience Member:

There's so much here, it's incredibly rich. I guess what I was thinking that what the commissioner said was really interesting to me in terms of how to weave together things that you're talking about here. It seems like you've created an invitation for many, many people to be able to take it and they include former perpetrators, people in the community. They pick people who are bystanders and there seems like there's something really important about that that relates to Professor Staub's comment about empowerment and changing the culture. Instead of the bystander who feels like, "I don't care" and could be immobilized by, "I don't know what to do," that sort of

immobilization. It's put on the table that this is a problem we all share, so what are the resources? What are the ideas? Where's the energy people need? I don't know, that's something that struck me. It's not really a question I guess, it's a comment.

Kathleen M. O'Toole:

I could answer something that gets very frustrating for me. I love my job, but I do get frustrated from time to time because we work in a business where unfortunately police are in there day in and day out in very challenging situations and tragedies result. And we have an organization with 3,000 people and I wish I could say that all 3,000 of them are rescuers and are wonderful people committed to service, but we reflect the rest of society and all it takes is one rogue cop to do something stupid that undermines everything that the good people have been working on. That coupled with that fact that, and I will never bash the media because I have lots of friends in the media, but the media can be used very effectively to communicate with our communities. But we hear the stories from my friends in the media, you know that if it bleeds, it leaks. The media is working for interesting stories and some media outlets get involved with sensational stories more than others but it's very difficult for us to communicate some of these. That's why I try to get out to some of these events like this. I think it's very important to communicate what we're trying to do that goes beyond the day-to-day shooting or the day-to-day tragedy.

You see police shows on TV, you know whether it's CSI or Law and Order, it's all about shoot-outs and car chases. People don't understand that about 95% of the job is about providing service to people in need. That only a small bit of it is enforcement and even in terms of trying to recruit the right profile, the rescuers, we need to better communicate what police really do and what we want to so we attract the right people to our business. Those are some of the challenges we're facing. I mean, because we can go out into these communities and do a thousand great things that people really appreciate, but we have one tragic shooting or one rogue cop does something inappropriate and it undermines all the good work we've tried to do. But I think once we build up a greater trust, maybe people will understand, you know we're going to have tragedies from time to time but we know that we're really trying here.

David G. Satin:

To change the norm. Change the culture about what to expect.

Audience Member:

I was thinking about this many years ago, what's so hard to understand is why people act the way they do, which is really something that you all raised as a primary question. The perpetrators who turn a corner seem to me to be a very interesting group of people because there again the question of why? What was it that got them to turn that corner? Because if you just look at the Smith family, or that group, that community that

you mentioned, Grove Park. Those people are empowered. They're not empowered in the way that we would like to think they're empowered, but to walk into a public place with these t-shirts on and say, "Stop the snitching" or "Lady, you're never going to find out anything if you ask," that's a form of empowerment. So people who go back in there again, who have turned this corner, how do you find out what it was that helps these people turn around? All in all, I think it's an incredibly impressive thing what you guys are doing in the police department and hopefully will raise these questions about how does this happen? How do we know how we all behave? Love and hate makes the world go round. It seem to be a very sort of reductive way to talk about this, I don't think it is when you unpack it but those are very powerful motivating emotions. So to do something that's positive like that is really impressive to me.

Ervin Staub:

You know, one of my other identities is working on how we can help non-violent children. Socialization in the family. I am very interested in how one can enter these families that you identified and help the adults be different. Now of course, those adults have to transform in some ways and we believe this may be going on because it seems sort of logical next step. Trying to understand what goes on with these feloners, some of these things in terms of values and beliefs and relationship to society. But others may be more experiential, the way the adults teach the children, not teach, interact with the children and the child's experience of the family. So in the children who are violent often experience harsh treatment and then that gets transmitted. But it is conceivable that there is a family in which they got a fair amount of love and closeness but they are deeply socialized into certain kind of attitude toward society. So, which one is it? It would be very important to find out and then it would be very important to answer because over time, obviously, I'm not talking short-term problems, long-term problems.

Audience Member:

I just had a couple of thoughts. One of you talked about resilience and I think the research has shown in terms of people who are resilient who come back from bad situations or come out of bad situations and are constructive is the mentor, which you also mentioned. A lot of children say, "You know there's this one adult that turned my life around." I think some kind of role model or mentor situation where that might be the problem, might not be the problem but you never get. The other thing that I was thinking of, the work in schools at least in Vermont. A lot of the schools are now doing a lot of work around teasing and bullying, which is kind of a similar dynamic where kids are teasing each other, or someone's being bullied and the kids don't stop it. They are sort of the bystanders there. What's cool and what's not cool? And should I? Or shouldn't I? I don't know if kids would care to say anything about that, but I think they've all been to seminars and workshops at school around that theme. Also, that there are a lot of schools in Vermont where they have officers in the high schools and literally stay there all day.

They have a role in the school and the kids get to know them as Officer Friendly, or whatever you want to call them. But they have developed a relationship such that they can talk to that person as an adult figure, coupled with that you know they're a policeman. You can talk about drug situations, you know if you see other kids getting in trouble. They may feel more comfortable telling or tattling. So those are just some thoughts.

Audience Member:

You know, I think it's interesting how we started out with the presentation with the model of the bystander-perpetrator and take us to what's actually happening and how confused those roles get. And when you started talking about the culture of intimidation, when people don't act, there's a place for discussion around who's a bystander? Who's a perpetrator? It gets really confusing. Or who's a victim and who's a perpetrator? And I'm thinking about your discussion of racism and who actually is a rescuer and who is behind this with the sense of working with police. But it's often a conversation of how the police are perpetrators. Not that I agree with that, but I think there is some degree of resistance when the roles get really confused.

Ervin Staub:

A few years ago, I did some training actually of Boston police with some other people here in Boston and the officers in the room were saying you know, "We go into a neighborhood and people are throwing beer bottles at us from the windows." And there was then an assistant superintendent in the room and he was talking about how some communities see the police as an enemy and the police comes out in that perception, to harass them.

Kathleen M. O'Toole:

We certainly have lots of room for improvement.

Ervin Staub:

You know, again, it's important to establish the reality of the ground, to change the reality and to change the perceptions of those realities. Sometimes some of the realities may be that things go wrong and certain neighborhoods that still can be on-going hostility between the people and the police. How can one change that? You know, how can one influence that? And if it is changing, how can one diminish the lag time? Because if the community continues to act hostile to the police, they are human beings and they react in a similar way and then they would cycle.

Kathleen M. O'Toole :

You know, I have an answer. It just struck me, it reminded me of some experiences I had in Northern Ireland when I rode around with police officers there, around the time

when the agreement was crafted by Senator Mitchell but especially in housing developments in the inner-cities in Northern Ireland. It didn't make any difference whether we were in a Catholic housing development or a Protestant housing development, the police would pull in on this big land rover and all the kids would run out and start throwing bricks and start throwing bottles at the land rover. But suddenly we encouraged a few community police teams to really take a huge risk, because so many police officers had been murdered and injured in Northern Ireland. But we said, get out of those big, ugly land rovers, take off your riot helmets, wear your ordinary clothing, and walk down the street and see what happens. And instantly, these little kids who would once come in throwing the bricks, were curious and would run up and engage in conversation. So I think a lot of it has to do with breaking down the barriers and that's why we're investing so much time and effort into these programs where we have cops working with kids, you know building that trust and when you were talking earlier about the rescuers.

I can't tell you how many incredibly brave kids, 12- to 16-years-old, I see in some of these neighborhoods in Boston who are standing up in the face of the gang-bangers and saying, "We're not going to tolerate this. We want a better quality of life." There's actually a group of girls, ages 14 to 17 in Dorchester who started their own radio station, with the help of some private sector funding Downtown that the Mayor helped identify for them. They started their own radio station because they were sick of listening to all the trash on the radio and they wanted to start a station that they thought promoted cool music, but cool music that wasn't insulting or crude. How do we profile those kids and figure out how they went right versus what went wrong?

Ervin Staub:

That's a good question, although if you profile them in their communities not yet accepting of it yet, it puts them into danger. So, how do we make sure they feel supported I think is one important step; that they feel that they have allies. How do we get adults, agencies, the police, and others reach out to them in gentle but not obvious ways. I think that's extremely important because just as I was saying, bystanders can influence each other and when people step forward to get support. Sometime people rescue individually, somebody came to them, started to do it for a little while until this person could move on and then they stay for a long time. But sometimes it was a good move in some ways and then they continued. But in order to continue, they usually hook up with other people because they needed to have some support and connection to community from other people. So the more bystanders do have some connection, some support, the more likely they it is that they will continue. So when you see signs of that that doesn't expose them, try to provide support and then a lot of people will continue.

Michael Grodin:

You talked about resiliency and I wanted to talk about resiliency as it stands in working with survivors. The literature is much clearer in the survivor literature, we have things such as socialization, parent-child relationships, role modeling, religious activity, social support systems are all very protective in terms of them. It's not 100% again, I mean that's what's so fascinating; survivors, who would not appear to have not very severe trauma, who do very poorly. Obviously, people had lives before their trauma, but there are many factors and there are those who have had horrendous…I cared for a whole group of Tibetan monks who were imprisoned who do remarkably well who had tremendous trauma. And again, it's partially their sense of self, their religious tradition. So it's interesting. I think part of the reason why the rescuer data is not so convincing, maybe it's just sample ties here, but I think also its that people who are far away are not rescuers.

Audience Member:

I guess one thing that was disturbing to me was the discrepancies between the inner city of Boston versus the suburbs of Boston. And so I guess as a society, a culture, how can we not be bystanders? How can that continue to happen?

Ervin Staub:

How can that continue to happen and how can we not be?

Audience Member:

Exactly.

Kathleen O'Toole:

I can offer a very practical perspective. I can guess what we need to do is provide these children with great alternatives. They need to have safe school, safe neighborhoods, safe playgrounds and good alternatives. Most people suspect that youth violence happens on weekend nights, but most youth crimes actually happens after school between the hours of 3:00 and 6:00 in the afternoon, when they don't have any alternatives. So, we're trying to the best extent possible create after-school programs and for the older kids, summer jobs. It's amazing to me, how many of these kids in really tough neighborhoods…and I say, "What can we do for you? What can we do?" So many of them say, "We want jobs." I spent a lot of time following Mayor Menino around town trying to get people to step up, you know even saying to small business, it costs $1,200.00 to hire a kid for 6 weeks in the summer, even if you just hire one kid. So I think as a community, even beyond the city limits. Lots of times business leaders say, 'What can we do?" and I say, "Support good, solid programming for kids," you know and other alternatives such as jobs.

Ervin Staub:

I think one of the very important things about how we as passive bystanders can be active is to promote inclusive caring. You can raise a child to be a caring person. You can provide a child with love, guidance. You can do the things that I did in studies that actually engage others in helping others and you can still draw sharp lines between us and them. The "us" can be defined in a limited way; Red Sox and the Yankees, one argues that those people are bad, or whatever. You know, people who dress differently and they are "them," they are different. We need to socialize children into caring and secondly, we need to socialize them to be inclusive caring. Extend the boundaries of "us." In one study of the rescuers, they found that the rescuers were more likely to come from families that socialize with people who did not belong with the "in" group, whatever that may be defined. And also engage with others in general and more with Jews. Now, it's one thing now to socialize. But the way you talk about the other, the way you act towards the other, the way you engage withy the other, in addition to the mis-institutionalized and we have a need to institutionalize in very different ways.

There was a study in India of three cities in which when there was some sort of instigators, there was a lot of violence and three cities remained violent. And in the three cities that were violent, under certain conditions that were institutions to which Hindus and Muslims both belonged, institutions that were important to them, that had weight in the community and these groups did two primary things at the time when there was some kind of instigators. One is, they mobilized to check rumors. Cause one of the things that happens in rumors spread and they mobilized that when politicians used those circumstances to create some kind of ethnic fervor, to go to those politicians and say if you're going to do such and such, we are going to respond and we are going to counter as best as we can to try to diminish your influence. So it became in the interest of the politicians not to do that.

Michael Grodin:

One thing I just wanted to say in terms of empowerment, which I think is a theme we've heard a lot about. It's very important where the kids try to be empowered to try to resolve their own problems. I think often times you don't think you put their understanding of the problem onto the kids as opposed to saying, you direct your own ideas and then they come from them and then they're a rescuer.

Ervin Staub:

And can I just say this? I have the sense that you are actually doing this. That get the police officers and be part of community organizations so that the members of that organization and police actively know each other, work together, have shared goals. Very valuable.

David G. Satin:

And both learn from one another.

Ervin Staub:

Exactly.

Audience Member:

I would like to say something to start with Dr. Satin and make some general questions to the whole panel about this. My question, is about the overall culture and the wide opportunities. We focused in on Boston, in Germany, in Rwanda, there's two similarities in the way I see it is the best of the two political parties in America. One party focuses on individual responsibility and the second party focuses on community responsibility at their best. At their worst, it's every person is an island and the other end of the spectrum, it's everyone fault for problems tat they have. A number of years ago my wife and my son went out to Price Edward Island and were traveling up there for many years and just a couple of remarks about that. One of them, I lived in Nashua and was voted the best community to live in twice by a magazine by economic indicators. Well, I went out there Price Edward Island, working with human service and it was after a series of murders in Nashua and I went up to Prince Edward Island and I spent the whole day researching crime rates up there.

At that point they had a population of 320,00 and at that time Nashua was probably 70,000. We were having 5-6 murders. Price Edward Island over the past 2 years has no murders at all. Second part of the story, a number of years later a friend of ours threw a party and we got to talking and we both had two young kids and I said you should think about going to Price Edward Island for a vacation. Well, to make a long story short, another couple came over and the bottom line was this, that they ended up on the trip, they bought a plot of land, they had a builder connected with them with their realtors and my friend who does construction with the human service group that he belongs to. When they finalized the deal, my friend says, "You need to sign a contract." And he says "Well, I suppose so because his word was the word and the final part of that was how I was there when the house was built." The builder, Randy from Prince Edward Island, refused to take the final payment because the bill didn't satisfy his criteria.

So the overall thing is that we focused on individual parole tasks but overall and I understand what you're saying to Commissioner, murder is not the only thing but we have the highest murder rate, we continue to have the highest murder rate. We have the highest rate of gun violence and many other countries, Canada to the north which is historically often the second highest is the western world has a very different picture. Clearly England has a very different picture, almost all western countries almost double and triple. It is a culture if it continues to do so and I'm interested in your remarks about what you see in more positive places in the world that we can gain from. It puts morals all the way on the crust. You know, what kinds of things do we collectively do in our political pursuits and cultural pursuits and what do you see in other more positive

cultures that really have resolved a lack of empathy and a obviously violence in all kinds of levels. It is just a very different experience being there. It is very, very different.

Kathleen M. O'Toole:

I think I need to visit this place.

Ervin Staub:

We could have the next one., They could take us up there.

Audience Member:

The place that I worked for 15 years, one of my colleagues was killed by a client and one of my staff members killed his wife. And this is a small place, two murders in a series of years and one place, two miles from my house. Soon after, when we were talking about attacking Afghanistan, there was a survey published din the New York Times and people were asked, if we don't know for sure whether to attack originated from anywhere in Afghanistan, cause it wasn't clear at the time. Should we still go and bomb Afghanistan? And 60% of the respondents said yes. I said that we have a culture of violence. You know, nobody must mess with me and if they do, I'll do something in response. And that's one thing. And related to that is the control of guns.

What country in the world has guns available to anybody and everybody basically? Either directly or indirectly? Now I've not yet explored so maybe there are countries but in the advanced technological world, I think we are the only one. And somebody in a short at some point, the difference in one related murder between Seattle and Vancouver. And there is a huge difference. And it's partly culture and partly guns. And if I get really angry and I hit someone, it's little different. But it has to do with the culture, I think you are right. It has to do with the culture. By the way, as a last word as the time is running out. I always forget I never do this but I would rather do this time. I have flyers here on two of my most relevant books, if anyone's interested.

David G. Satin:

Maybe this is the time to go home and continue the discussion with ourselves. It's a very important issue of doing right, doing right for other as well as doing right for ourselves. And what I brought away from this was the culture. That there is a culture of righteousness. That there is a culture of helping. That there is a culture that gives supports to people who do right and doesn't make it hard for them, them doesn't make it abnormal for them to do this. And how to make people want to do this and find that their neighbors support them in doing right. I want to thank you for coming to yet another interesting, unfinished discussion at the Lindemann Memorial Lecture and hope you'll come back next year to an equally interesting one. Good night.