Insights and Innovations in Community Mental Health

The Erich Lindemann Memorial Lectures

organized and edited by
The Erich Lindemann Memorial Lecture Committee

hosted by William James College

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Foreward

The Erich Lindemann Memorial Lecture is a forum in which to address issues of community mental health, public health, and social policy. It is also a place to give a hearing to those working in these fields, and to encourage students and workers to pursue this perspective, even in times that do not emphasize the social and humane perspective. It's important that social and community psychiatry continue to be presented and encouraged to an audience increasingly unfamiliar with its origins and with Dr. Lindemann as a person. The lecturers and discussants have presented a wide range of clinical, policy, and historical topics that continue to have much to teach.

Here we make available lectures that were presented since 1988. They are still live issues that have not been solved or become less important. This teaches us the historical lesson that societal needs and problems are an existential part of the ongoing life of people, communities, and society. We adapt ways of coping with them that are more effective and more appropriate to changed circumstances—values, technology, and populations. The inisghts and suggested approaches are still appropriate and inspiring.

Another value of the Lectures is the process of addressing problems that they exemplify: A group agrees on the importance of an issue, seeks out those with experience, enthusiasm, and creativity, and brings them together to share their approaches and open themselves to cross-fertilization. This results in new ideas, approaches, and collaborations. It might be argued that this apparoach, characteristic of social psychiatry and community mental health, is more important for societal benefit than are specific new techniques.

We hope that readers will become interested, excited, and broadly educated.
For a listing of all the Erich Lindemann Memorial Lectures, please visit www.williamjames.edu/lindemann.

The Erich Lindemann Memorial Lecture Committee presents

THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNUAL
ERICH LINDEMANN MEMORIAL LECTURE

Terrorism and Mental Health: Clinician and Patient Responses from Patriotism to World Community

Terrorism has come home to the United States as it has been known in most of the rest of the world for some time. It changes the tone of the world for us all, and is felt also in the clinical setting. Therapists and patients alike find their thoughts and feelings tinged by this new milieu. How do we respond to the impact of terrorism? Do we strike back in patriotic defense? Do we seek wider coalitions of allies who make common cause against the outsiders? Is this a call to join the world community in responding not only to the threat of adversaries but to the values and needs we all share? Shall terror drive us apart or together? This has meaning for the intimate therapeutic relationship and for the larger world in which it takes place. On this anniversary of a quarter century of Erich Lindemann Memorial Lectures we seek clinical, social science, and philosophical approaches to the complex issues of local and global community mental health.

Speakers

Shahla Haeri, PhD, Director, Women's Studies Program, and Assistant Professor of Anthropology, Boston University

Elizabeth H. Prodromou, PhD, Associate Director, Institute on Religion and World Affairs, Boston University

Leonard J. Duhl, MD, Professor of Public Health and Urban Policy, University of California, Berkeley; Professor of Psychiatry, University of California, San Francisco; Executive Director of the International Healthy Cities Foundation

Moderator

David G. Satin, MD, LFAPA, Assistant Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School; Chairman, Erich Lindemann Memorial Lecture Committee

Friday, April 26, 2002, 2:30–5:30 pm

Massachusetts School of Professional Psychology
221 Rivermoor Street, Boston, MA 02132

Introduction by David G. Satin, MD

For this 25th Lindemann Lecture we wanted a subject that addressed important issues of today and also illustrated the broad scope of social and community psychiatry. Of course the eruption of terrorism as a worldwide epidemic is present in everyone's mind; it also presents as an issue of universal mental health. While Erich Lindemann began his interest in social psychiatry with the influence of social supports and losses on the health of individuals (patients with ulcerative colitis, the grief that followed the Coconut Grove nightclub fire), he progressively broadened his interest to communities (the Wellesley Human Relations Service), cities (the West End Study of urban relocation), nations (medical education in India), and international relations. I remember his remarking, "If you have a little war it affects the mental health of millions of people."

Terrorism affects the mental health of those injured and bereaved, and of the community that feels insecure and hated. It also reflects on the mental health of those who terrorize others- their anger, frustration, and coping with their predicaments in a destructive way. How do we understand and respond to this order of mental health issue? Responses to terrorism, too, can be approached through the mental health paradigm, in terms of preventive intervention and adaptive or maladaptive response. Shall we accept the challenge and "fight them on their own turf"? Shall we receive these "cries for help" sympathetically and meet their needs? How do we respond to the competing needs of warring parties? Do we need to step back and look at the situation with more open minds, learning more about the needs, separately about the demands, and seek some resolution that responds to the conflicts within the protagonists as well as those between them? This leads us to educate ourselves about the contributions of culture, history, social structure, politics, and psychology to the participants and their predicament. This is slower and provides less immediate gratification than "showing those bastards who's boss." It also requires the openness and honesty to reconsider what we know and to learn. But this is the daily task of the mental health practitioner, including social and cultural factors and a population (rather than individual) perspective is the essence of social and community psychiatry—at least as Lindemann defined it.

So our topic for the 25th Lindemann Lecture allows us to practice community mental health on a world scale as well as its reflection in the therapeutic encounter between clinician and patient. We have the gift of three outstanding scholars who can teach us some of the sociological, cultural, and public health aspects of Terrorism and Mental Health.

Shahla Haeri, PhD

Director, Women's Studies Program and Assistant Professor of Anthropology, Boston University

Introduction by David Satin, MD

Shahla Haeri, Ph.D. is Director of the Women's Studies Program and Assistant Professor Anthropology at Boston University. She has conducted research in several countries with major Islamic populations; written on religion, law, and gender dynamics in the Muslim world; taught cross-cultural courses on gender and religious fundamentalism; and was involved in the University of Chicago "Fundamentalism Project," studying global fundamentalism. She is the author of *Law of Desire: Temporary Marriage, Mut'a, in Iran,* and the forthcoming *No Shame for the Sun: Lives of Professional Pakistani Women*. Professor Haeri has studied Anthropology at Northeastern and Harvard Universities, has her doctorate from the University of California at Los Angeles, and been awarded two Fulbright grants and many fellowships. Her contributions on Islam and religious fundamentalism are crucial to this discussion, and we are very grateful to her for participating.

Shahla Haeri, PhD—Political Terror: Women's Body, Nation's Honor

Greetings, thanks, and being honored to present a paper at the 25th Anniversary of the Eric Lindemann Lectures. Let me begin my talk by making a disclaimer. I am no expert on either terrorism or mental health, though as a person living and conducting research in Iran, Pakistan, and the United States, I have been both subjected to threat of terror and felt the insecurities and tensions that are usually associated with such emotions.

So, I would like to enter the debate from a different angle, which is to say from a more individualistic and anthropological perspective. Before moving into the bulk of my talk, however, let me say that glancing quickly at the list of people who have had the honor to give talk at the Lindemann Memorial lectures, it seems to me that I am the only – and the first – Muslim scholar invited to address this prestigious community. I am truly honored. I appreciate the surging desire to want to know one's Muslim fellow human beings, to bring down the wall of distrust and treatment of Muslims – as vast and diverse as they are – as if they are peculiar or exceptional.

Toward that goal, I would like to first give a brief overview of what are some of the issues involving "Muslim women" in the imagination of the other. Second, to give you a specific example of violence against a Pakistani woman, and her strategies for survival. Third, to show a few slides about Pakistani women's – and men's - demonstration in support of this particular woman, and against the perpetration of violence against women.

Let me begin with a few anecdotes that bring out the prevailing assumptions and images regarding women from the Muslim world, and I think can provide the framework for the discussion I would like us to follow: Once in the late 1980's, I was being interviewed on the status of 'Muslim women' by a human-rights activist. In the course of our conversation, he used the term "Muslim women" frequently, generally, and indiscriminately. It seemed as if he did not see me as an Iranian, Muslim woman belonging to a particular society with a particular history and from a particular class, education, and professional background. Which Muslim women were he talking about? He seemed profoundly innocent of the actual geographical, historical, cultural and ethnic boundaries within and among Muslim societies. Did he think Iranian women, diverse though they are in class, education, and ethnic identity, are really the same as Pakistani women or, for that matter, Saudi Arabian, Algerian, Afghani, or Malaysian women? How could the realities of every day life of such a vast and diverse group of women, within and across the Muslim world, be so uniformly viewed and so unproblematically understood?

I asked him whether he would use such an essentialized term - and meaningless at this level of generality - when speaking, say, about Latin American women. Would he feel just as knowing and comfortable to refer to them as 'Christian women?' 'No,' he said. 'Why not?' I asked. 'Because, uh…' he said 'Well, there is something peculiar about Islam!'

Is there something peculiar about Islam? Is 'Islam' the leveler of diversity and difference that he perceived it to be? Islam is of course a world religion that transcends many cultural boundaries and territorial borders. But can one begin to understand different cultures merely by looking at their shared religion? Islam is constitutionally declared to be the state religion of both Pakistan and Iran. Are there no differences between 'Islam' as practiced in Iran and 'Islam' as practiced in Pakistan? Is there all religion and no culture in Muslim societies? What is the underlying power mechanism that gives the right to an apparently rational observer to state such categorical claim to knowing the 'other'?

A few years back I met a woman professor at a university faculty party in the eastern United States. In the course of our conversation, she learned that I had just returned from Pakistan where Benazir Bhutto had been democratically elected prime minister for the second time (1993). Rather incredulously, she asked, 'How is that possible? Isn't she a woman? Isn't Pakistan a Muslim society?' 'Yes, she is a woman,' I said. 'And yes, Pakistan is a Muslim society.' It does not automatically follow that because Pakistan is a Muslim society that no woman can be elected a prime minister or that no Muslim man will ever vote for a Muslim woman.

Last year in a Christmas party I was introduced to a professional woman, a clinical psychologist, as an Iranian Muslim feminist. Without a pause she said, 'Wow, that must be an oxymoron!' No chance for comments on my part, for she continued, 'Well, there are always exceptions.' Presumably as a Muslim woman, she seemed to suggest, I should

be veiled, or at least not be so similar to my Western counterpart. My imagined difference from other Muslim women was, in fact, less confounding than my perceived commonality with Western women.

I am always taken aback when, despite my efforts to explain the 'phenomenon' of hopelessly passive, veiled 'Muslim women,' a majority of my students and colleagues retain their stereotypical images and beliefs of women in the Muslim world. The sensitivity they – and many scholars – show regarding the differences of race, class, and ethnicity in their own communities does not seem to extend to their Muslim sisters. The cultural and historical diversity of women's lives and the specificity of their experiences and activities seem to escape them, even as I, an unveiled, educated, professional woman stand before them. Somehow, they do not seem to hear or see me as a reality different from their tenacious image of "Muslim women:" passive, victimized, and veiled, if at times sympathetic. Or, if they do take note of my presumed "difference," they seem to think that I am inauthentic or an exception. I wondered how analytically and politically useful this mega-category of obedient "Muslim woman" was, and how it was created historically and sustained popularly for so long, so stubbornly. How is it that my students, colleagues, and many others in the larger society seem to ignore my presence and that of many other women in my situation, and so resolutely hold on to images of women they have never actually met? How did I become invisible? I puzzled over the management and dissemination of knowledge in the west and the apparent resistance to learning about the differences and similarities among and within Muslim societies and Muslim women. The anomaly of educated, professional Muslim women needed to be addressed, I decided.

Popular perceptions become particularly hard to dislodge because some Muslim states, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Algeria, have themselves produced enough news to encourage images of brutalizing 'Islam' and victimized Muslim women abroad. These states enforce and propagate their own unitary image of 'Muslim woman.' Caught in the clashing multiple demands of modernity, nation-state building, and religious awakening, they appear to be constantly wobbling between granting women certain citizenship rights – initially often under international pressures - and withholding effective implementation – often under more conservative and religious pressures.

Muslim states are, of course, not uniform in their approach to address and redress the legal, political and social inequalities of their women citizens. The states, more often than not, are contested entities in the Muslim world, hardly representing a democratic and majority point of view. Ironically, it was the Taliban's harsh measures taken in the name of Islam in Afghanistan that seem to alert the Iranian Islamic Republic to its own puritanical absolutism and its untenable claim to the 'Truth' of Islam. Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran's spiritual leader since 1989, has condemned the Taliban for its anti- and un-Islamic behavior, particularly its attitudes toward women.

Undoubtedly, many Muslim women have been victimized (as is more or less true in most societies) and veiled, and this should not be trivialized. But the institution of veiling, purdah (as it is known in south Asia), though dominant in Muslim societies, is neither the source of women's victimization in the Muslim world nor exclusively a Muslim institution, though it can be, and has been, restricting of women's autonomy and independence. "Although Islam helped to institutionalize and perpetuate modesty and seclusion practices by endowing them with the aura of religious sanctity, these practices did not originate with Islam; they were well established in Byzantine and Syriac Christian and pre-Christian societies of the Mediterranean, Mesopotamia, and Persia before the coming of Islam" (Dumato 1995, 19-20). The custom of sex-segregation or purdah is a well-established tradition in north India and is prevalent among both Muslims and Hindus. I am referring to the practice of sex-segregation and not necessarily to the veil itself.

But the symbolism of the veil, the motivations for wearing it, its styles and gradations - from a loosely draped scarf to complete covering - vary tremendously in form, color, and style within and across Muslim societies. Some women wear a veil out of religious conviction, some to be distinguished as respectable, others to remain anonymous or safe, and still others to cover their poverty. Some wear a veil out of respect for local custom and still others, under the threat of punishment, are forced to. Besides, veiling is primarily an urban phenomenon, and many peasant and tribal women, though modestly dressed, do not wear a veil.

That some – or many – women are veiled does not necessarily mean that they are miserable, victimized, or inactive, though of course some may very well be. That stereotype is objectively called into question by the fact that in the late twentieth century many Muslim middle-class professional women have chosen to veil themselves, particularly in Egypt and Malaysia. More challenging is the presence of veiled Iranian women leaders in the parliament, who the closer they are to the foci of power, the stricter they observe veiling (Gerami 1996, 125-50). Although Iranian women have been forced to wear 'Islamic veiling' in public since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 – and many resent having to do so – they are participating more than ever in their own society's political and social life.

The active presence of Iranian women in the public space is not, I must say, because of gender-friendly policies of the Islamic regime, but because of women's own determination and sustained challenges to the regime to respect its own rhetoric and to fulfill its promises of 'gender parity.' Many women have turned the veiling requirement into a license to appear in public, to resume professional careers, and to demand changes in personal laws and political and professional institutions. Even here, the agency of the veiled and professional women does not seem to pose a challenge to the outsider's assumptions of veiling and passivity. Rather, it is perceived either as a confirmation of veiling and oppression or as an anomaly and a paradox, reifying further the outsiders'

stereotypical imagining of gender roles and status in the Muslim world. Indeed women's choices to veil are seldom understood as individual or collective strategies used by some professional and working women as a way of empowering themselves to assume a profession and to function in the public domain (e.g. women wearing suits in corporate America).

Looking in the mirror of the growing feminist literature on 'Muslim women,' I did not see many women with whom I, as a professional Muslim woman, could identify. I saw veiled women, peasant women, tribal women, urban poor women, but very few educated, middle class, professional women. Why, I wondered, has this category of Muslim women escaped the attention of anthropologists? What historical forces and theoretical rationales contributed to the 'veiling' of this highly visible category of women in Iran and Pakistan and the rest of the Muslim world? How is it that the cultural discourse of this politically significant - if small - segment of Muslim societies has so rarely been heard outside their own societies?

Let me describe three major reasons.

1. The media representation of "Muslim women"

The incessant focus on veiled Muslim women, and fetishization of the veil in the electronic and print media, its automatic equation between veiling, oppression, and female passivity - if occasionally erotic - has led to fascination with and fear of veiled women simultaneously. The veil has come to be the hegemonic, the dominant, image of women from the vast Muslim world, obliterating the cultural and historical diversity of women's lives and the specificity of their experiences and activities within and across the Muslim world.

2. Historical: Gate Keepers of Knowledge

Historically, the problem is due to the two dominant and formative discourses of the past two centuries that merged into powerful frameworks determining the parameters for funding, studying, and researching in the Muslim world. By far the most important was the Orientalism discourse and the Orientalist textualist approach to the study of Muslim societies, notwithstanding the ongoing academic and political debates and disputes. The other involved early anthropological attempts to construct anthropological canon of the Middle East. Whereas the first drew on the 'high tradition,' using the scripture as the blueprint for understanding the Muslim world, the other identified the village or tribe as the 'unit' of analysis, generalizing it to the entire Middle East (Eickelman 1989; Gilsenan 1990, 231; Street 1990; Van der Veer 1993). In both cases the Middle East as a society and Islam as a religion were analyzed within the current theories of modernity, sovereignty, and social change; both society and its religion were

presumed to be homogeneous, monolithic and resistant to change (Breckenridge & Van der Veer 1993, 7-8; Hefner 1998).

3. Theoretical: Fascination with Difference

The apparent invisibility of professional Muslim women in the ethnographic literature and academic discourse, and the theoretical silence on their role in the changing configurations of power and knowledge in their societies is puzzling. This is a category of women who has become reflexive of the changing sociopolitical situation and cultural transformations domestically and internationally in the past few decades. They are mustering intellectual, political, and economic resources to claim their rights in the history of their society. They are, in Geertz' words, 'authoring themselves,' in the sense of demanding attention to be paid them (1986, 373). Attention, ironically, is what they have not received, at least not in the mounting researches done on women by Western anthropologists nor ironically by Muslim women anthropologist themselves.

Responding to a growing criticism from women from other cultures, colors, and classes, feminist anthropologists abandoned their earlier assumptions of 'women being women everywhere' (Moore 1988) and became sensitive to cultural differences and variables of class, race, and ethnicity. Redirecting their gaze and refocusing their attention on the difference, feminists celebrated it with relish.

The fascination with difference as the hallmark of group identity has concealed the similarities between self and the other. If the West is assumed to be so different from the rest - particularly form the Muslim East - or that if anthropology is a 'discipline built on the historically constructed divide between the West and the non-West' (Abu-Lughod 1991, 130), then how could Muslim professional women be similar to Western professional women? Who is a Muslim woman if she is not veiled? How is a Muslim woman to be identified, and thus safely differentiated from the Western self? Who *is* she? Where does she belong if not behind a *purdah*?

My point is not to draw a one-to-one correspondence between professional Muslim women and their Western counterparts, or to insist on the likeness based on their common physiological denominator. But to point out that an exceptionalist view of Muslim women – and by extension of gender relations as well as of political relations (i.e. that there is something peculiar about Islam, and "Muslim women") – militates against grasping Muslim women's life as familiar and their struggles as akin to those of women in other countries. My stress on similarity is to highlight, in Rolf Trouillot's words, that 'the Other, here and elsewhere, is indeed a product – symbolic and material – of the same process that created the West' (1991, 40; Kahdiyoti 1991, 4).

If professional Muslim women have remained invisible and unheard outside their own countries, and if they have only been sporadically represented in the existing ethnographic literature, it follows that our knowledge of the diversity of gender relations, gender politics, and of Muslim women's experiences in the vast Muslim world is

fundamentally flawed. More important, the academia's silence on the contributions of educated professional Muslim women to their society perpetuates the historically constructed perception of Islam as 'monolithic,' 'hegemonic,' and as 'exceptionally' controlling of people's day to day life, particularly that of women.

As professional women become active players in Pakistan, and in much of the Muslim world, the contestations over who has the legitimacy to define, interpret, and control the sacred text and cultural traditions have intensified – much like in other part of the world. Although relatively small in numbers and diverse in their professional pursuits, these women play an active role politically, are knowledgeable about their society, and are aware of the contested discourse of religious legitimacy and political alliances nationally and of the rapidly changing configurations of gender, power and knowledge internationally.

Violence Against Women: One Woman's Ordeal and Strategies for Survival

The etching of political rivalries onto women's bodies for national honor – or to inflict dishonor – is *not* unique to Pakistan. Rape and violence against women as expendable objects during political conflicts and territorial dispute have a long history and are not peculiar to any one particular society or culture. A global glance at the ways political and ethnic conflicts are expressed across cultures reveals the symbolic significance of violating women's bodies as a means for dishonoring the enemy while underscoring the self's national identity and masculine honor.

Rahila was a devoted 24-year-old political activist who belonged to Pakistan Student Federation (PSF), the student wing of the Pakistan People's Party, headed by the former Pakistan Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto. Her ordeal brings into focus the plight of women in police custody and the abuses of women political prisoners for political propaganda. Rahila was arrested, tortured and hospitalized in a psychiatric ward for over nine months in the beginning of the year 1991. Rahila's father is a civil servant, living with his wife, their four daughters, of whom Rahila is the eldest, and one son in a comfortable state-owned house in a colony just outside Karachi. All her family members were devotees of Benazir Bhutto and activists on behalf of her People's Party.

Before her arrest, her house was searched, and she was arrested on the pretext that she had received weapons and ammunition, and had passed on secret messages to Indian agents. When she refused to cooperate with the Sindh authorities to fabricate charges of sexual misconduct and national security allegations against Benazir Bhutto and her husband, her interrogators turned sadistic. So severely was she beaten and tortured that at some point, she lost consciousness, and subsequently had to be hospitalized and remain under psychiatric care.

The violence perpetrated against Rahila while in police custody and the terror unleashed at her to oblige her to do the bidding of the state, I argue, is a variation of political rape. The target of humiliation and shame, in other words, is not necessarily a

specific woman. It is rather a political rival - an old enemy - on whom revenge is to be taken (K. Ahmed 1992, 36-37; Haeri 1995).

Theoretically, violence against women have been variously conceptualized in terms of controlling female sexuality, in terms of restricting women's autonomy, in terms of humiliating and so keeping them out of sight, and in terms of maintaining male control and dominance. While these ideas are relevant, there is something more I wish to emphasize in the case of Rahila. Her case involves an act of revenge aimed at humiliating and dishonoring a powerful and potentially threatening rival, but with a gender twist that made it poignantly meaningful in the cultural context of Pakistan.

Here the 'enemy,' the political rival, was none other than Benazir Bhutto! How is that possible, one might ask? She herself is a woman. Precisely the point! Although out of office at the time, Benazir Bhutto was a powerful rival to contend with. When female members of her party are tortured and raped, not only individual women are dishonored, but symbolically Benazir Bhutto herself, the leader of the opposition, a woman of feudal lineage, a notable citizen, and the model of womanhood, is 'raped' by association. How could a nation, any nation, choose to have a raped leader? Conversely, how could a leader who is unable to protect herself or her followers protect her country from being invaded by its 'enemies,' real or imagined?

Pakistani women have for centuries buried in their hearts the rage and anguish of rape. In the interests of family honor and from fear of ostracism, they were – and still are – forced to keep quiet or face humiliation and abandonment by their families. Potentially, Rahila faced the dilemma of raped women who put their own honor and that of their families in jeopardy. Determined not to allow that, Rahila categorically rejected being raped, notwithstanding the lingering doubt in the public mind, and so acted 'appropriately.' Her denial secured her social acceptance – ambivalent though it might have been – she honorably returned to her family, and saved her family from the shame of living with a 'raped' daughter. She supported her claim to purity on the basis of her family background and lineage, insisting that the police did not dare to touch her, even though they routinely rape women in custody.

Ironically, the state's projection of sexuality and dishonor of Rahila onto Benazir seem to have been internalized by Rahila herself. She clearly identified her persona with that of Benazir Bhutto, and appeared to imagine herself as the 'double' of Benazir Bhutto. Repeatedly, she denied accusations of sexual misconduct against Benazir Bhutto, and appealed to female religious figures to underscore her own honorable intent and conduct. By adamantly denying any possibility of rape, Rahila protected not only her own honor, but also that of her leader/double, and thus of her nation as well. Saving her leader, for whom she repeatedly proclaimed love, Rahila refused to substantiate allegations of sexual misconduct against her. In turn, she ensured her own salvation, not only psychologically but also politically. Her plight was publicly acknowledged by

Benazir Bhutto, who arranged for Rahila to be sent to America for rehabilitation, and she was given a party ticket to run on.

Moreover, her persistent refusal to implicate Benazir Bhutto in the face of extreme brutality saved her and her leader from being trapped in a cultural and political 'no-win' situation (Doniger 1999, 283). She escaped the possibility of being rejected by her family [and the nation in the case of Benazir] as well as of being destroyed by her/Benazir's enemies. She upheld her honor, *izzat* as a member of Rajput tribe, and as a pure [sexually unmolested] woman. Her public stands for social justice and her categorical denial of rape, in turn, denied her tormentors and Benazir's 'enemies' the satisfaction of having broken or dishonored her. In fact, it did the opposite, and allowed her to gain a degree of self-respect. It enabled her to run for a political seat, and restored a degree of honor to her family.

Rahila's active political participation and agitation for democracy and civil society challenge many an outsider's view of 'Muslim women' who are imagined to be generally passive and without social visions. It also threatens a segment of her transitional patriarchal society that has increasingly felt compromised by professional women's autonomy and independence. They see women's public appearance and activism contrary to the ideal gender relations, and as an infringement on the male privileges that, in their view, are sanctioned by the Divine command.

Rahila had a mystical sense of her religion, and frequently invoked religious imagery to underscore the justice of her political objectives, the propriety of her actions, and to rationalize the personal consequences of her imprisonment. In dreams and in wakefulness she identified herself with the prominent religious female leaders such as Hazrat Zainab (the Prophet's granddaughter), who although held captive by her enemies, her political courage became legendary and her purity was exemplary. Rahila upheld the leading Muslim women as models par excellence for womanly conduct and moral courage. The spiritual power she received from Islam intimidated her male captors, while providing her with a means to cope with her ordeal, psychologically and culturally.

I was impressed by her ability to distance herself from her horrifying ordeal, to reflect on it often philosophically, and to speak about it in such great detail. More important, her powerful imagination – and her determination - helped her to develop her survival skills well during both her torture and her recovery as ways of maintaining her sanity and her ability to enhance her budding political career. Above all, by denying being raped while identifying her plight and her conduct in jail with those of the leading religious women, she situated her ordeal within appropriate cultural and religious contexts. Triumphant, in a sense, Rahila thus laid claim to her honor unambiguously. As painful as the experiences of raped women have been, they have confronted Pakistani society with a moral tension, leading to greater public awareness of the issue of violence against women. They have also strengthened the resolve of many Pakistani women activists to reclaim their bodies and voices. They are determined to speak out, realizing

that remaining silent for any longer, in the words of Kishwar Naheed (1991, 31), is a ‘crime.’

Elizabeth Prodromou, PhD

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Introduction by David Satin, MD

Elizabeth H. Prodromou, Ph.D. is Associate Director of the Institute on Religion and World Affairs, Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations at Boston University, and is Executive Director of the Cambridge Foundation for Peace. She holds the degree of Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and a Doctorate in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She is a regional expert on southeastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean and has focused on religion and international relations, nationalism and conflict resolution, and non-traditional security threats. Her writings include "Democratization and Religious Transformation in Europe's Southern Tier: Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece," "Paradigms, Power and Identity: Rediscovering Religion and Regionalizing Europe," "Public Religions and Democracy in Late Modernity: Intellectual and Political Sources of Peace and Conflict in the New Europe," and "Making Sense of Terror: Global (In)Security in the New World Order." We are grateful for her expertise in the meaning and management of security.

Elizabeth Prodromou, PhD—A Sense of Terror: Global (In)Security in the New World Order

I want to begin by thanking the organizers of today's Lindemann Memorial Lecture for the honor of participating with such distinguished panel members, and likewise, for the honor of speaking on such an auspicious occasion. After all, the subject of today's lecture a crucial one in terms of the kinds of public and private challenges that we face, both as citizens/residents of the United States and as members of the global, human community. In fact, as I researched the history and mission of the Lindemann Center, I realized that Erich Lindemann's legacy was that of a mental health professional with a rigorous commitment to inter-disciplinary dialogue and inquiry and an unshakable belief in the importance of public policy conceptualized and applied in the broadest sense of the word. So, it is in the spirit of Dr. Lindemann's memory that I've written my paper for today.

By way of preliminary introduction, let me offer you some brief autobiographical details: I am trained as a political scientist, and my work has been consistently focused on questions of democracy-building and public religion, nationalism and conflict resolution, and culture and security. I've explored these questions from both the academic and policy perspectives, primarily within the context of Southeastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean and, consequently, with links to US and Transatlantic actors. So, in terms of my professional locus, my own encounters with the problematic of

terrorism have come through a series of discussions about the emergence of state capacity, preventive action, and non-traditional security threats. In terms of my personal locus, I come to today's lecture from my place as a mother, wife, woman, and as an American citizen with familial history in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean, regions with long experience in the tragedies of terror in many dimensions.

I share this autobiographical sketch in order to situate myself as a social scientist with no training in the mental health field, so that my insights into the mental health implications of terrorism should best be understood as those of an informed layperson. Having said this, what I hope to contribute today is a degree of clarity when it comes to understanding the pernicious psychological effects associated with contemporary terrorism. Or to be more specific, I want to explore the proposition that terrorism is a phenomenon with deep historical roots, and therefore, is not unique to our current global context; however, what may indeed be unique about terrorism in our time is the conceptual, operational and moral contexts that shape the phenomenon, a claim that, in turn, suggests extraordinary complexity in the scope of mental health problems generated by terrorism.

To explore this proposition, I will divide my paper into three parts. First, I will provide a schematic of the historic roots of the phenomenon that has come to be identified as terrorism, in order to suggest the loose, although increasingly contested, consensus that has emerged over the definition of the term. Second, I want to explore how contemporary manifestations of the historical phenomenon of terrorism differ in terms of the motivations for (national liberation, religious belief) and actors involved (perpetrators and victims) in terrorism, thereby provoking a kind of existential shift and operational shift in understanding the responses to terrorism. In particular, I want to link this collapse of the loose consensus on the definition of terrorism to the impacts of globalization on the role of the state and the conception of security in the post-Cold War era. And by way of conclusion, the third part of the paper will sketch some observations about the cognitive contradictions (allies that are terrorists), definitional confusion (perpetrator-victim categories), and operational deficits (state capacity for response) that help to explain the unique mental health implications of terrorism today.

Part One: Defining the Phenomenon: the Evolution of Terrorism in History

One would expect that a review of the historical evolution of terrorism necessarily must begin with a definition of the term itself. Yet, Walter Laquer, who is considered by most analysts to be the dean of terrorism experts in both the scholarly and policy domains, has observed that it is neither possible nor worthwhile to try to develop a comprehensive, yet parsimonious, definition of terrorism.[1] The difficulties in providing a

[1]See the reference to Laquer's position, in Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998): 39.

precise definition of the term terrorism become apparent with even a cursory review of various well-respected dictionaries, including the Oxford English Dictionary,[2] Webster's,[3] and Cambridge Dictionaries Online,[4] each of which reveals a frustrating diversity of meanings assigned to the term terrorism. Consequently, a potentially satisficing definition of terrorism emerges from an inductive process, one that is rooted, first and foremost, in examination of the historical record, and second, in systematic cross-checking of definitions that help to reveal constitutive patterns of the terrorism phenomenon.

Because of time constraints, I am forced to be necessarily elliptical in reviewing the historical evidence that can help us to progress from observations of individual cases to the development of a general conception of terrorism. Some representative cases useful for our definitional exercise include the following. As Caleb Carr tells us in his just-published work on "the lessons of terror," the practice involving "…the deliberate military targeting of civilians as a method of affecting the political behavior of nations and leaders." In other words, what we understand in popular convention today as terrorism–existed as far back as antiquity.[5] However, the term existed in ancient times under a host of other terms, including destructive war and punitive war. Most historians date the origins of terrorism back to the 12th century, when the Order of the Assassins was inaugurated by al-Hasan ibn-al-Sabbah. This secret organization was driven by theological-political disputes within Islam, and was based on a hierarchical structure of missionaries, disciples, and devotees (*fidavis*), the latter of whom were the trained killers whose actions–under the influence of hashish, according to some scholars–created broad-based terror in the Muslim world at that time.[6]

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[2]"A system of terror. 1. Government by intimidation as directed and carries out by the party in power in France during the revolution of 1789-1794; the system of 'Terror.' 2. *Gen.* A policy intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted; the employment of methods of intimidation; the fact of terrorizing or condition of being terrorized." *The Oxford English Dictionary, Compact Edition* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1971): 3268.

[3]"The systematic use of violence as a means to intimidate or coerce societies or governments." See http://work.ucsd.edu:5141/cgi-bin/http_webster?terrorism&method=exact

[4]"(Threats of) violent action for political purposes." See http://dictionary.cambridge.org/.

[5]Caleb Carr, *The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare Against Civilians: What It Has Always Failed and Why It Will Fail Again* (New York, NY: Random House, Inc.): 17.

[6]Some date the origins of the Assassins to the year 1092, when the Vizir of the Seljuk Sultanate was mysteriously murdered by an individual disguised as a Sufi; this was the first of a series of mysterious murders which plunged the Muslim world into terror and which came to be associated with patterns of killing that marked the Order of the Assassins. For various treatments of the origins of the Order of the Assassins, as well as their techniques and effects that came to be viewed as the hallmark precursors of terrorism, see Arkon Daraul, *A History of Secret Societies* (1999) and Marshall G.S. Hodgson, *The Order of Assassins* (1980). "In pursuit of their ends they made free and treacherous use of the dagger, reducing assassination to an art. Their secret organization, based on Ismailite antecedents, developed an agnosticism which aimed to emancipate the initiate from the trammels of doctrine, enlightened him as to the superfluity of prophets and encouraged him to believe nothing and dare all." For the quotation, see http://www.alamut.com/subj/ideologies/alamut/hitti_Ass.html

In this arguably original manifestation, terrorism was understood in terms of the tactics of a secret organization, driven by theological ideology, utilizing methods of targeted, yet arbitrary, assassination to wreak popular havoc.

Also representative in the historical genre of what has come to define terrorism was the period from 1793-1794 in France, during which the revolutionary state utilized methods of intimidation, arrest and judgment, and death by guillotine to crush any opponents of the infant revolution who were deemed to be sympathetic to the *ancien regime*. In this case, the *regime de la terreur* in France, in contrast to the Order of the Assassins in the Muslim Middle East, was driven by the secular ideology of the Enlightenment and the associated virtues of popular democracy. So, terrorism under the revolutionary leader Maximilian Robespiere, involved the state's use of systematic, organized violence in the name of reinforcing the will of the people against oppressive monarchs and their foreign and domestic allies; significantly, with the collapse of the revolutionary regime, the *regime de la terreur* came to be reinterpreted as crimes committed through the abuse of office and power.[7]

In many senses, the Order of the Assassins and The Terror laid out the paradigmatic features of what came to be associated with subsequent manifestations of terrorism in identifiable periods of history. In the early modern period of nation-state formation that ran from the late 18th century to the early 20th century, exemplary cases of terrorism were those of the People's Will (*Narodnaya Volya*) and the Inner Macedonian Revolution Organization (IMRO): the former was a late-19th century, revolutionary group that opposed the tsarist regime in Russia through the use of target killings of specific individuals chosen because of "...their symbolic' value as the dynastic heads and subservient agents of a corrupt and tyrannical regime;[8] the latter was a secret revolutionary organization dedicated to systematic violence designed to terminate Ottoman imperial rule in the Balkan region of Macedonia. During the interwar and Cold War periods of international relations, terrorism came to be identified with authoritarian and totalitarian political regimes like those of fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Stalinist Russia, all of which utilized systematic, comprehensive state violence in tandem with para-military gangs to harass, intimidate and exterminate real or imagined opponents of the regime. And finally, in the post-WWII and Cold War periods, terrorism was also identified with anti-colonial, revolutionary movements, dedicated to national self-determination through the use, when necessary, of multiple forms of violence against human and physical targets whose defeat would bring about the psychological and practical bases of imperial control.

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[7]"The Terror was at an end; thereafter terrorism became a term associated with the abuse of office and power–with overt 'criminal' implications." Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*: 17.

[8]Ibid: 18.

What should be clear from this condensed treatment of over a millennium of history is the emergence of a profile of terrorism. This profile becomes clearer still by augmenting historical inquiry with what I noted earlier, namely, the systematic discourse analysis of both popular and specialized sources. Consequently, terrorism came to be defined by the unlawful use of violence, whether by states or non-state actors, for overtly political purposes. Within this general definition, terrorism emerges more specifically as violence and/or force designed to change existing power relations, ideologically justified regardless of accepted legal norms and humanitarian constraints, perpetrated through victim-target differentiation, thereby provoking psychological fear and intimidation and manipulating publicity and symbolism.[9]

How does this loose definitional consensus on terrorism, particularly under the enormous contemporary shadow of the 9/11 tragedy, lead us to mental health considerations? Let me move ahead towards an answer by turning now to the second part of my talk.

Part Two

My reference to 9/11 bears a moment of reflection: I would argue that the events of that date, probably more than any other single event in US history, have provoked a highly contested, sometimes acrimonious debate, not only about the meaning of terrorism, but equally important, about the legitimate responses to terrorism. Furthermore, given the global hegemony of the United States at this particular historical conjuncture, the consequences of the debate on terrorism within the American context will have compelling repercussions in a world that is increasingly shaped by the competing forces of globalization[10] in economic, demographic, ecological, and political terms.

So, let us now return to history, but this time, to the more recent history of the end of the Cold War. The termination of the bipolar struggle not only changed the dominant features of 20th-century international relations, but also helped to catalyze a set of profound shifts in the system of international relations that was inaugurated in the

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[9]One of the most comprehensive efforts at developing a uniform definition of terrorism is that by Alex P. Schmid in *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1984), as well as that from which the data above are drawn, in Alex P. Schmid, Albert J. Jongman et al., *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988).

[10]For interesting debates on the nature and consequences of globalization, representative works include John Beynon and David Dunkerly, eds., *Globalization: the Reader* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2002); David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995); David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Gldblatt, and Johathan Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999); James H. Mittelman, *The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000);

Treaty of Westphalia in 1648[11] and reinforced at the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, and that is meant to be protected by the legal and practical mandate of the United Nations.

Indeed, the system of international relations that obtained for four-and-a-half centuries had recognizable features, not only for the institutional actors in the system, but also for a global citizenry that had largely internalized, if unconsciously, those features as follows. The international system was dominated by a system of sovereign states, whose monopoly over force was legitimated in return for maintaining the integrity of the territory under their control and in return for providing certain public goods to all those living within the borders of that territory.

According to this logic, security was a commodity understood in purely military terms and was monopolized by states, which enjoyed the right to defend against both external and internal threats to the military stability of their sovereign territory. Further, states were authorized to utilize all means of force at their disposal to inflict maximum violence on threats to the nation, so that state power came to be understood narrowly in terms of force projection. Finally, the only limitations on state behavior regarding what was unarguably a specifically military conception of security were the constraints of international laws and conventions to which states themselves have subscribed (e.g. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions), in order to protect human rights and to institutionalize standards of humanitarian assistance, such that soldiers, but above all, civilians, would be shielded from the most horrible effects of war that came to be understood as war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The end of the Cold War marked a rupture in the certainties of the international system as it led by states and inhabited by citizens. Most relevant to our considerations today is the rupture in international relations rooted in the effects of globalization in weakening the hegemony of the state and in generating a more diverse conception of security. Globalization itself remains a highly contested term amongst scholars and policymakers, particularly since the processes of globalization are not easily specified as dependent versus independent variables. However, there is little disagreement that globalization has meant expanding networks of inter-dependence at the sub-national, inter-state, and transnational levels.[12] Equally recognized is the fact that the multiple

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[11]The Treaty of Westphalia is named for the northwestern region in Germany where the document was signed, after four years of deliberations, to end the Thirty Years War, a Protestant-Catholic conflict that degenerated into one of the most destructive conflicts in the history of Europe, as religious differences and power politics were also affected by economic interests and commercial rivalries. For a superb treatment of the Treaty of Westphalia as the establishment of the overtly secular nature of the system of international relations, see Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).

[12]In a masterful study on the impacts of globalization on the conceptual and operational problematic of war, Mary Kaldor has discussed globalization as "…the intensification of global interconnectedness–political, economic, military and cultural….This process of intensifying interconnectedness is a contradictory process involving both integration and fragmentation, homogenization and diversification, globalization and

and contradictory processes of globalization have, as a whole, contributed to what Mary Kaldor refers to as "…erosion of the autonomy of the state and in some extreme cases the disintegration of the state."[13]

It is in response to the undeniable erosion in the conventional power of the state–particularly in terms of the monopoly over the use of legitimate violence–that discussions of globalization have also been related to the drive to reconceptualize security in the late-20th and early-21st centuries. Specifically, security has come to be understood in terms of a broad basket that includes military might and force projection, natural resources, political rights, health care, and economic justice,[14] suggesting the non-feasibility of longstanding divisions academic and policy approaches to problems of development and strategies for security.[15]

The termination of the Cold War was an understandable catalyst for academic and policy inquiry into the impacts of globalization on state autonomy and the meaning of security. After all, the collapse of state socialism in Europe, including the Soviet Union, was interpreted as evidence of the superiority of liberal democracy, market economics, and their associated capabilities for force projection and military protection. Consequently, policy and popular expectations in the Transatlantic space seemed to share a vision of global convergence towards the political and economic models and military might most iconically represented by the United States.

Yet, these expectations proved unfounded and it is in the explanations for the unanticipated consequences of the end of systemic bipolarity that we begin to discern the radical changes in the conceptual and operational parameters of terrorism vis-a-vis historical manifestations of the phenomenon. Furthermore, it is the open-endedness of those changes in the parameters of terrorism that we begin to find the material to generate a dialogue on the mental health implications of terrorism. Let me turn to the final portion of my paper to sketch the major shifts in the profile of terrorism at this current historical conjuncture, as well as the potential for negative multiplier effects on the mental health condition of those who are now living in this contemporary age of global (in)security.

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localization." Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999): 3.

[13]Ibid: 4.

[14]For a readable and comprehensive synthesis of the initial post-Cold War discussions on the need to reconceptualize security in the post-bipolar era, see Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods," *Mershon International Studies Review* (1996) 40: 229-254.

[15]For a provocative discussion about the merging of security and development problematics, see Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: the Merging of Development and Security* (London, England: Zed Books, 2001).

Part Three: Concluding Observations on Terrorism and Mental Health in a Context of Global (In)Security

In order to draw our conclusions, we need to return to the historically-informed profile of terrorism that I summarized in the first part of this paper. On first glance, we see that the primary features of the terrorism profile have undergone important refinements over the latter part of the 20th century, and especially, since the end of the Cold War.

For example, terrorism continues to be understood as the unlawful use of violence, whether by states or non-state actors, for overtly political purposes, and more specifically, as violence and/or force designed to change existing power relations. Yet, the latter part of the 20th century reflects a marked diversification of the organizations and individuals who have resorted to violence for purposes of political change, as illustrated by the fact that terrorist acts for avowed political purposes have been carried out by the KLA, the ETA, and Timothy McVeigh.[16]

Similarly, there has been an increasing pluralization in the organizational structures of terrorist actors, whether these by state or non-state. Claire Sterling's popular work on the terror network of the 1970's[17] detailed sophisticated, transnational terrorist networks of cooperation amongst non-state groups and diasporas that shared training facilities, financing networks, and intelligence information; these networks developed cooperative links between organizations such as the PLO in the Middle East, the Irish Republican Army in Belfast, and the Shining Path in Peru. Additionally, data collected by agencies and institutions dealing with terrorism–for example, the Federation of American Scientists Intelligence Resource Program, Interpol, and the US State Department[18] revealed a sharp rise in the phenomenon of state-sponsored terrorism.

Also notable has been the tendency towards an increasingly complex logic of the cost-benefit calculus applied to victim-target differentiation:[19] distinctions along mass-

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[16]The Kosovo Liberation Army was dedicated to the full independence of the Yugoslav province of Kosovo from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The *Euskadi ta Askatasuna* or Freedom for the Basque Homeland) has committed a steady stream of violent attacks on Spanish political elites and civilians towards the goal of forcing Madrid to grant independence, or at the very minimum, autonomy, to the Basque region of Spain. McVeigh was convicted in mid-1997 of carrying out the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Office Building in Oklahoma City, USA in 1995; he and his alleged accomplices committed the attack as an act of rejection against their perceived view that the US government has been taking steps towards changing citizens' constitutional rights to bear firearms. See Lou Michel and Dan Herbeck, *American Terrorist: Timothy McVeigh and the Oklahoma City Bombing*.

[17]Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network: the Secret War of International Terrorism* (New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1981).

[18]Responsibility for the enhancement of coordination and cooperation in combating terrorism by Interpol (International Criminal Police) falls within the domain of the Public Safety and Terrorism sub-directorate (PST). The US State Department issues an annual report on *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, that provides a list of state sponsors of terror according to US criteria for evaluation; for full details and archives on the reports, see http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/annual_reports.html.

[19]For an excellent synopsis of this aspect of the terrorism profile, see Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice," in Walter Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism:*

versus-limited casualties, symbolic-versus-practical value of targets, and civilian-versus-official (state) victims, are integrally related to what experts identify as innovations in the mechanisms of terrorism and, consequently, to the temporal and physical dimensions of psychological effects desired. The 9/11 attacks speak compellingly to the evolution in all of these factors in the terrorism profile, as the number and diversity of victims at multiple symbolic- and practical-value sites, hit by the use of low-tech mechanisms, has produced maximum returns on the psychological scale of fear, grief, mourning, loss, depression, anxiety, and weakening of public confidence in the conventional lines of defense against terrorism.

From an evolutionary biology perspective, one might argue that what we are currently seeing is an evolutionary continuity, rather than a rupture, in the historical trajectory of the terrorism profile. However, what makes the current stage in this trajectory so intriguing in intellectual terms and challenging in moral and policy terms is the fact that the specificities of the current terrorism profile must be understood within the systemic context of a weakening in state autonomy and a redefinition of security. As a consequence, the interaction between specific and systemic changes have compromised our ability to provide consistent, satisfying answers to two simple questions: namely, how do we differentiate between the perpetrators and the victims of terrorism, and how do we make collective decisions about legitimate responses to and punishment of the perpetrators of terrorism? The inability to respond efficaciously to these questions leads to myriad mental health considerations with regard to conditions such as fear, anxiety, grief, loss, trauma, depression, obsession, and compulsion.

Perhaps the most crucial factor in the blurring of the perpetrator-victim categories and the confusion over legitimate responses to terrorism has been the diminution in the state-centeredness of the international system in the late-20th and early 21st centuries, a phenomenon highlighted by the emergence of non-state actors with demonstrated capacity to operate both below and above, inside and outside–in what Susanne Hoeber Rudolph has identified as the liminal spaces–of the international system.[20] Particularly instructive examples of the decline in the hegemony of the state include the emergence of religion as a compelling actor in the public sphere, at the domestic, international, and transnational levels; the crystallization of religion as a public actor in the international system has challenged longstanding notions about the putatively secular nature of modernity. Equally significant has been the activities of criminal organizations that

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Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998 edition): 7-24.

[20]Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and James Piscatori, eds., *Transnational Religion & Fading States* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997). In problematizing the study of religion as a transnational phenomenon, Hoeber Rudolph suggests that the impact of religion on global politics, and in particular, the effects of religious communities in redesigning the conceptual and operational parameters of international relations, lies in the fact that religions operate in "…the liminal space that cuts across inside/outside, a space that is neither within the state nor an aspect of the international state system but animates both:" 1.

traffic in weapons of mass destruction, small arms, narcotics, and human beings. In short, the impressive expansion in the role of non-state actors such as religious institutions and organized crime has deepened debates about the state's legitimate monopoly over management of the international political, economic, and military order.

However, confusion of the perpetrator-victim category and disagreements over legitimate response to terrorism have also been exacerbated by the reconceptualization of security after the Cold War. Indeed, the last decade has witnessed repeated weaknesses in state capacity, whether unilaterally or multilaterally, to provide regular delivery of the diverse basket of goods discussed earlier in this paper; the failures of state capacity have been rendered more striking in efforts at crisis response to threats to security at the individual, community, and national levels, as in the failure to provide famine relief in Bangladesh, health care in America's middle- and lower-class populations, and protection against genocide in Africa.

The series of events that has unfolded as part of the 9/11 acts is especially instructive in exploring the problems that have emerged in distinguishing perpetrator-victim categories and in defining legitimate responses to terrorism. Parenthetically, it bears mention that the specificities of those acts fits the new definitional profile for terrorism that I noted earlier, and it is in their interaction with systemic factors from which the lack of answers emerges. There was little doubt about the technical designation of the perpetrator-victim categories in the 9/11 events. However, the degree of global consensus about the real perpetrator-victim categories began to emerge surprisingly quickly in the aftermath of the events, as competing perspectives, with sharply variance in the degrees of analytical and policy sophistication, began to emerge. These competing perspectives were discernible in terms of economic divisions along traditional North-South lines, cultural divisions along newly-devised civilizational lines, ideological distinctions along left-liberal versus right-conservative lines, and global-local divisions along elite versus popular lines. Indeed, where initial reactions suggested an international consensus that *Al Qaeda* had perpetrated unprecedented terrorism against American victims, the intensifying discourse along the aforementioned cleavages began to suggest that the causes of the acts might justify plausible reconsideration of the perpetrator-victim categories.[21] Nowhere has this discussion about the lack of clarity in perpetrator-victim categories been more intense than the debate over American foreign policy in the Middle East.

The blurring of perpetrator-victim categories has been particularly aggravated by virtue of the US-led coalition response to the 9/11 events. In particular, the combination of special forces actions to support what has become a demonstrated technique of

[21]There has been an extraordinary multiplication and intensification of the debates about the causes of and responses to the events of September 11, 2001, which touch explicitly and implicitly on the definition of perpetrator-victim categories. For an illustrative electronic compilation of the discussions, see http://web.mit.edu/cms/reconstructions.

preference by the US and its allies in warmaking after the Cold War (e.g. in the Gulf War and in the war against FRY) has been a staple of the operation in Afghanistan. This technique involves what Mary Kaldor identifies as "...spectacular aerial bombing which reproduces the appearance of classical war for public consumption and which ahs very little to do with reality on the ground...[since it generates]...many civilian casualties."[22] In this sense, the blurring of victim-perpetrator categories that was generated by the expansion of the discussion into the causes of the 9/11 events–a discussion that inevitably touched on the failures on state capacity to deliver a more complex basket of security goods, with the impact of those failures perceived as greatest along lines of cleavage that were rooted in class and culture–has been compounded by an ever-increasing debate about the legitimacy of the coalition response to *Al Quada* terrorism rooted in Afghanistan. The US-led efforts to expand what has been labeled the war on terrorism to other countries, notably, to Indonesia, the Philippines, and likely, Iraq, has been marked by a further decline in the consensus–at both elite and popular levels–about the definition of terrorism and the legitimate scope for response. In more concrete terms, the collapse of these conventional reference points have been rendered especially acute by virtue of the fact that many declared US Allies seem to fit the profile of behaviors that have been generally applied to terrorism.

To sum up my conclusion here, the reconfiguration of systemic factors (the role of the state and the definition of security) and the complexity of the specific profile of terrorism, have combined to generate serious questions about the moral, ethical, and legal underpinnings that have defined terrorism and legitimate responses in historical terms. Consequently, the average citizen, regardless of geographical location or national designation, is living in an experiential context marked by cognitive confusion and contradictions as well as psychological fear and alienation, due to the fact that those conventional reference points that help us to map our individual and group behaviors seem to be changing at a rapid pace without any consistent direction. In this respect, we are living through a period of global insecurity whose characteristics may indeed broaden the mental health issues–by that I mean symptoms and diseases, as well as clinical and institutional responses–in unprecedented fashion. Perhaps the greatest challenge for mental health practitioners and social scientists alike will be to recognize the need for dialogue, cooperation, and sharing of information, in order to deal efficaciously with a level of systemic instability that intrudes into the daily lives of all human beings. In this sense, the global and the local have become inextricably linked through our individual and collective psyches.

[22]Kaldor, New & Old Wars: 3.

Leonard Duhl, MD

Professor of Public Health and Urban Policy, University of California, Berkley; Professor of Psychiatry, University of California, San Francisco; Executive Director of the International Health Cities Foundation

Introduction by David Satin, MD

Leonard J. Duhl, MD is a psychiatrist trained at the Menninger Foundation as well as a psychoanalyst trained at the Washington Psychoanalytic Institute. He was Assistant Health Office in Contra Costa County, CA (one of the creative sites in the development of community mental health), Chief of Planning for the National Institute of Mental Health (where he helped develop the Peace Corps, the Office of Economic Opportunity, and participated in the study "Mental Health Aspects of Forced Urban Relocation- The West End Study," which Dr. Lindemann directed. He was a consultant to Robert Kennedy and Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. For some time he has been active in the "Healthy Cities Program," consulting in the United States, Europe, and developing countries and he maintains a web site on this topic: www.healthycities.org. Of interest to today's topic, he presented a paper on disaster planning for health officers in Latin America. Dr. Duhl's publications include *The Urban Condition, Health Planning and Social Change,* and *Health and the City: The Governance of Diversity*. Leonard Duhl is Professor of Public Health and Urban Policy at the University of California, Berkeley, and Professor of Psychiatry at the University of California, San Francisco. Leonard Duhl was one of Erich Lindemann's closest confidants and colleagues in community mental health, and brings a special insight and historical perspective to this 25th Erich Lindemann Memorial Lecture.

Leonard Duhl, MD—Crisis – Depression – Terrorism

I am particularly honored to be here at the 25th Anniversary of the Erich Lindemann lectures. Erich was my friend, my teacher, my colleague, might have been my employer, and was even my Vermont landlord. I was fortunate to have been able to spend a few hours each week, reviewing his life with him before he died, thanks to both Erich and Betty. During these times, we explored together how often we had been thinking differently from others. Both of us were uncertain of our acceptability to the larger psychiatric and medical community. Despite this we were able to achieve positions of status. During the 50's, 60's and 70's, we were considered outsiders. We were *outside the box*. As the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development said to me, "*one of you is enough*."

I need not review Erich's history and accomplishments thanks to his wife Betty's[3] Biographical Sketches and David Satin's Memorial Lectures[4]. However, I am still concerned that people understand the broad fields that he opened up and where many of the currently accepted ideas in those fields came from. Fortunately I participated in many interchanges as Erich moved from a bench scientist, to a psychoanalyst, to his broad concern with community. From Wellesley, the Harvard School of Public Health, Massachusetts General Hospital and the West End, Stanford, and especially in the Space Cadets [5], I watched his mind expand. He continually incorporated new ideas, cross-linked with new people, stimulated students, and began to live in a broad multidisciplinary world. Despite his many accomplishments, in his final days he questioned what he had contributed.

What is the Current News?

I would like to start in the present, and talk about our *current crisis*. How might Erich have seen the impact of current world changes on our lives, what forces are at work? Then, I will go back to Erich's work on crisis theory and depression[5]. I will then discuss the impact of these issues on psychotherapy and the broader social milieu. Finally, I want to discuss Erich Lindemann's legacy and the challenge it poses.

I talk as a psychiatrist, trained as a psychoanalyst, and as a public health activist, concerned with communities and cities, and with community participation in their governance. I am a *holist* as one colleague calls me, putting me down slightly. I am a wanderer on city streets worldwide. My implicit goal is to change our hierarchy of values, connecting ourselves to deep spiritual roots. All this will become apparent as I speak.

The Current Crisis and Our Response

I recently returned from a meeting discussing the needs of Afghan refugees. A diverse group of people, much like our old Space Cadets, was brought together [6]. Our concern was to show how to improve the refugee camps. The group ranged all over the lot, from physicians to environmentalists, the military (in a new mode), experts in appropriate technology, mycology, communications, and much more. Three women from Afghanistan worked with us. Our goal was to get "*out of the box.*" Immediately I

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3 Lindemann, Erich, 1900-1974. Beyond grief : studies in crisis intervention /, Erich Lindemann. New York : Aronson, c1979. xxiv, 274 p.: and in Erich Lindermann : A Biographical Sketch

4 Insights and Innovations in Community Mental Health Ten Erich Lindemann Memorial Lectures, by David G. Satin (Editor), Elizabeth Lindemann Brainerd, Jean Farrell (Editor), Elizabeth Lindemann (Editor)

5 The Space Cadets was an interdisciplinary group that met several times per years for three day. It was a free thinking group, that indirectly through its participants planned many of the Kennedy-Johnson era program. It laid out a systemic and ecological paradigm for health and cities. There is only one book that emerged, the Urban Condition, Leonard Duhl (ed) Basic Books, 1963.

6 Called together in Santa Barbara, Ca by the Rock Mountain Institute.

was brought back to the West End. Just as in the West End study, we talked about topics such as dislocation, cultural differences, grief, bureaucrats, politicians, education, access, housing, and social support[7].

The lessons learned in the West End had to be translated into a new context. In Afghanistan are dislocated people, unwanted by their hosts, faced with health problems compounded by all of the deprivations experienced by refugees in an impoverished host country. How do you respond?[8] Is medical care the solution? Or is it improving the quality of their lives? Is it medicines, or is it shelter, water, sewage and food? How do cultural issues and the perceived needs expressed by the refugees themselves impact decisions?

Let me return to this later, after commenting on our larger current crisis. This is because, as I believe, we always must look at "the news behind the news." Crisis, as Erich often pointed out leads to a repetition of old behavior. This misses all the opportunity. We are in the midst of responding to a series of events which were long below our horizon. The World Trade Towers destruction on 9/11 shocked our consciousness with its pain and horror, and created a tremendous need to get *out of the box*.

The ever constant reporting has found an enemy, the extremist Moslems, whose goal is to destroy America and the West. They tried to do so by attacking a symbol of our capitalist, financially oriented, and technically successful world. They aimed for complete collapse and demoralization and in many ways did not succeed. The resourcefulness of Americans to respond to crisis is immense. Our ability to plan for crisis, especially for a complex crisis, is not nearly as good.

Erich taught many of us how to interact and respond to family and the world when we are faced with a crisis, small or large. People get disorganized, and fall back on old, familiar models to respond. We tend to forget the Chinese ideographs for crisis, *danger and opportunity*. Erich showed us that by intervening at the moment of disorganization we could discover new ways of responding.

In my view, we as a nation responded to the international implications of the World Trade Center disaster with old patterns. We declared war. We used bombing and military might learned in Viet Nam and the Gulf War. Our only innovation was to supplement the bombing with token food drops. An effort so inadequate that Afghani fathers are forced to sell their children, to stave off the starvation of the rest of their families. However, we find at home and in Afghanistan that most of the old forces are still at work. We thought we could bomb out an alien set of values. We can't! Indeed Afghanistan today is a country in chaos. Warlords have again taken over, with no real resolution of governance.

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7 There are several reports of on the west End. One is Marc Fried's "Grieving for a Lost Home" and the other, The Urban Villagers by Herbert Gans.

8 Crisis Intervention (The Master Work Series) by Erich Lindemann, Jason Aronson, c1979. xxiv, 274 p.:

In New York and around the country, there were different responses. In New York especially and throughout the country, a new community spirit arose through volunteering, and the giving of time, energy, money, and blood. People began asking themselves about possible new life styles. At the same time, we saw a magnification of the response to the Coconut Grove fire of November 28, 1942. [9] Many people, both those directly involved and those connected in any way to the disaster, were traumatized. Some were devastated. They turned to religion, advisors, and therapists. As in the Boston fire, those who are unable to process their trauma or grieve their losses sufficiently are vulnerable to depressive and other illnesses. As of now we do not know the range of disorders that will emerge. Erich was again right.

There was a tremendous call to solidarity and patriotism. American flags sprouted everywhere as if they were ritual objects to ward off terrifying demons. We created ceremonies, rituals, religious events, and new communities emerged. It was if the terror, pain, anger and bewilderment had to be covered over by a positive face. It worked to mobilize our energies to go to war and to rebuild our own country. Those closest to the death and destruction tend to be the most active in community building activities and the most at risk for lasting emotional and physical illnesses. While in the months immediately following 9/11, the majority of the American people emphasized the need for tolerance and understanding that the terrorists did not represent Islam, the national leadership has responded by increasingly aggressive behavior and by enlarging the pool of enemies.

Therapy and Grief Counseling Come to the Fore

Since 9/11 increasing numbers of people have been seeking psychotherapy. We can think of concentric circles of impact. Those close to the tragedies, in New York and Washington and those whose loved ones were injured or died, have been hit the hardest. Their relatives, friends, and colleagues, making contact from all over the world, experience continuing distress as well. Distance mitigates the reaction. I see the West Coast trying to cope with the unreality of a *continuing television show*, while on the East Coast the events are all too real. It is as if we on the west coast ultimately became numbed by the repetitions of images that initially served to imprint the awful reality of the events. We were not there but I have seen repercussions in relatives and friends of those in New York, Washington and on the hijacked flights.

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9 It is interesting that most of the literature I found on the fire, was about fire protection and response. See:

On Nov. 28, 1942, the Cocoanut Grove was crowded with revelers. Fire broke out. But except for a evolving door at the front, the exits were locked. And that door quickly jammed. Some 492 people died - many piled up by the door - in the worst fire disaster in U.S. history. The fire led to dramatic changes in fire codes (and to this day, Massachusetts fire departments are among the toughest in the country in enforcing them). Many of the survivors had their lives saved by a revolutionary new drug - penicillin. from Bizarro Boston

One paper by Erich is important since it lead to much of his work on grief. Lindemann, E. (1944). Symptomatology and management of acute grief. American Journal of Psychiatry, 1944;101,:141-–148.

These relationships have awakened in those most affected old real and primitive fears of overwhelming *loss*. They too, are, going through *grief work*. They need to talk and express their feelings. They are questioning if the values they have lived by. They experience terrifying dreams, and in one case dream of demons and dragons. They turn back to their home and family.

In my work with my current patients extends the work I have been doing with communities which has emerged over the past few years. It could be called *ecological, multidisciplinary therapy* involving social, psychological, spiritual and biological components.[10] I will speak more of this later, when I return to the Afghanistan refugees.

The News Behind the News

First, a return to looking at the broad issues behind our present crisis. They are presented in no special order, for they are all interrelated and important to our understanding of the context. We are living in a global world. Our world has changed into one big interactive community, with many sub-parts made up of diverse groups. Globalism began with the financial market, the multinationals, and continued with the INTERNET. Time was removed as a critical issue, since there is instantaneous information around the world. Monetary issues have left us with two primary currencies, the dollar and the euro. There are have been demonstrations against globalization in Seattle, Davos, New York, and elsewhere. We know that the environments of the world interact continuously. Those of you aware of chaos theory know that an event thousands of miles away can have disastrous impact on local weather. Oil crises change the way we live our lives, prices rise in every sector of the economy, and we discover that the relationship of foreign policy to globalization is very important even in the minutia of our daily lives. We are one earth.

Globalization has lead to a blurring of political boundaries. On one hand there is a move to come together. The European Community is such a phenomenon, with the new *euro*, a common currency, and new regulations that affect all its members, to some of their detriment. At the same time, in many places in the world, what we call nations, are broken up over centuries by war, mobility, ethnicity, religion, economics, and lack of healthy leadership. The former Yugoslavia is a case in point.

Looking at Africa, we see tribes that previously migrated in the sub-Sahara become refugees. We find the artificial boundaries of the Colonial governments have exacerbated traditional tribal enmities. We see a *divide and conquer* strategy. We see destruction of previously balanced societies, however fragile, due to encroaching desertification, hostility between tribes, hunger, famine, poverty, and AIDS. Increasingly, the boundaries are breeched illegally and because we in the West need cheap labors, we export our pollution for temporary economic gain. We destroy local agriculture and make people

10 Duhl, Leonard, Confessions of a Psychotherapist, Menninger Clinic Bulletin Summer 2000.

who were previously self-sufficient dependent on huge agricultural industries, on the market, and on international trade.

With all these changes there has been a massive increase in the diversity of local populations. In Oakland, California there are more than 273 language groups, each struggling to deal with the world *outside* their neighborhoods. Cities are growing exponentially. Latin America is over 70% urbanized, the world, 60%. Displaced by the collapsed rural subsistence economies, people pour into the tenements, shantytowns, and favellas of the cities seeking work. Many of those who stay behind turn to drug crops in order to survive. Cities have become *megalopoli*, gobbling up agricultural lands to plant new housing. Already inadequate human service resources are stretched beyond their limits, their workers are lost to burnout, and when the total budget goes out of balance, education, health, housing, environment, social services, and those things that affect the quality of our lives are cut first. There is an ever widening abyss between the wealth of the rich and the poverty of the poor.

With the increase in problems that are multi-sectoral, attempts at solution are guided by linear thinking. For example, the response worldwide to starvation and hunger, with a few exceptions, is to send food. The answer to poverty is the dole or the streets. Increased testing and new requirements to qualify teachers are touted as solutions to the huge inequities of public education. Out of terror, we turn to secrecy, to the reduction of our civil rights, and to a vast expansion of our military operations. As I write this, our President is asking for $50 Billion for the military and $38 billion for domestic defense. Consider what a small percentage of our national budgets go to aiding others.

Sadly, there is a feeling of self-righteousness prevalent in America. Without closely examining our motives and our methods, we believe that we are always doing good and that we have everyone's best interest at heart. Incidentally, note that we do not attack nations outright, but use special guerilla forces for limited actions. Their job is to pick off the man who is the cause of our problems, to rout out terrorists and their supporters. It's not a conventional war! Sadly, the problem is greater and much deeper.

Essentially, the US goes it alone, with the rest of the world concerned that there is no real collaboration, only what the New York Times and others have termed "unilateral collaboration." The idea that a quick solution can be found to complex problems is not new. Only the current global scale is new. Politicians like these solutions, for they allow for increased exposure without the necessity of doing the time consuming and complex work of solving the problems which are causing the symptoms. Quick fixes make for good sound bytes, which translate into votes in the next election.

Security, seen in military and police terms, becomes more connected to quality of life. I recently heard of a discussion at West Point, where junior officers concluded that "only with a healthy community, does military or police security work." Can we not ask, if we are to be secure, whether we need arms, or food, job, housing, a clean environment

or our quality of life? It is interesting that as we try to improve the world, our foreign aid is woefully inadequate, so we use the International Monetary Fund to force cuts and to balance the developing world's budget. In order to pay off the interest on their loans, developing countries must sacrifice human, health, and social services.

There is a loss of awareness of history. Sadly we forget or never learn about our own past and we know little about the history of other cultures. If we were to educate ourselves, we would see that throughout history boundaries have been fluid, people have migrated, or been forced to seek refuge, intermarried and left their homes and families of origin[11]. If one looks at the major crossroads on traditional and contemporary trade routes, these have always been the intellectual hot spots. The Middle East 2000 years ago and New York today are prime examples. These diverse places are where the new ideas emerge, and the seeds for real progress sewn. I was fascinated, as I learned more, to discover that Afghanistan was such a place. It was the original home of Sufism, early Islamic medicine, art, and commerce.

The emergence of a new fundamentalism has coincided with the resurgence of nationalism. As we try to define ourselves, we look to our culture, our symbols, our land, and our traditional values. Those who would resist change take refuge in absolutist interpretations of sacred texts and disparage those who don't agree with their beliefs. In the US the political right is currently most vocal and dictates the ideas in good currency in our administration, affecting direction, policy, and budget decisions. Is it any accident that we measure success by efficiency and profit? It goes with the notion, that government is *bad* and the market is the answer. Except, of course, when our major corporations fail our government must bail them out.

We have answers to many problems, but can't put them into action. For many years, at the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), I found people with good research and answers to critical questions. Sadly, I found that less than 15% of their recommendations were put into practice. Why? Do those answers call into question the conventional wisdom, or the current idea in good currency? Are they too far "out of the box?" Is it then understandable that Erich Lindemann's work, though there is a legacy of major proportion, is still relatively unknown in our professions?

We know little about the governance of diversity[12] from the level of family to community, nation, region, and world. If, indeed, the world is getting increasingly diverse, and *change is a given*, the question of governance arises. I am not talking about government, but about the soft infrastructure of our communities. If we all had the same background and values, we all would have similar definitions of the common *good*. When cultures see the common *good* from different perspectives, there is confusion,

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11 The Times atlas of world history /, edited by Geoffrey Barraclough 4th ed. / edited by Geoffrey Parker London ; New York : BCA, 1993 360 p. : col. ill., col. maps ; 37 cm

12Duhl, Leonard,"Conditions for healthy cities; diversity, game boards and social entrepreneurs," Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 5, No. 2, October 1993.

conflict and chaos. Sadly, the stronger powers usually win and imposes their values on the weaker.

Too much of this has happened in the developing world, in cities, and here with our Native peoples, people brought here as slaves, and those from minority backgrounds. Since the end of World War II, and especially in the 60's, advocacy became an important counterforce in the governance of corporations, cities, and almost everything else. Now we are seeing how special interest advocates negotiate with power, with and without support of government. An old West End colleague and researcher, Bernard Frieden[13][14], now Dean and Professor at MIT, looked into the inner workings of the planning in cities. He discovered that down towns are not *planned* by the Department of City Planning of the city, but by endless negotiations between public entrepreneurs and public-private partnerships. They have revitalized the downtowns of our cities. This is a new form of governance that is emerging.

The soft infrastructures of communities include the rules we live by, our constitution, and our values. They, like the implicit rules of a large extended family, help in decision-making and the setting of priorities. How can we arrive at commonly held values and rules at the same time as encouraging and honoring diversity? As I discuss Healthy Cities later on, we will see that this is a learning process, and that it takes time.

We have polluted our environment and with that, compromised our children. I do not have to give statistics on environmental pollution. Bill Moyers on PBS made that strikingly clear. You might wonder why this is a mental health problem. Boston community psychiatrist, Matt Dumont[15], discovered high lead levels in the soil near the Charleston bridge while it was being cleaned. This was an area of dense low income housing. Dr. Dumont succeeded in stopping the work on the bridge and I believe ultimately sued the State. Lead was our first major environmental contaminant. Now there are in excess of 5000 biologically active chemical compounds, most untested, that are being poured into us and into our environment. The National Cancer Institute has stated that 60% of all cancers were caused by environmental pollution. There are chemical dumps near schools and recreational sites. Is this not a mental health issue?

Greed, as most recently exposed in the Enron case, has been a prime motivator in our society. With the emphasis on money, profit and the market, money has become the universal language. Economic analysts determine the future of our health systems. Privatization of education has brought business models to education. If one has power

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13 Frieden, Bernard J.. Downtown, Inc. : how America rebuilds cities /, Bernard J. Frieden, Lynne B. Sagalyn. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c1989. xiv, 382 p.

14 Frieden, Bernard J.. Downtown shopping malls and the new public-private strategy /, by Bernard J. Frieden and Lynne B. Sagalyn. [Cambridge, Mass.] : Joint Center for Urban Studies MIT and Harvard University, 1984. 41 p. ; 28 cm. Series title: Working paper (Joint Center for Urban Studies) ; No. W84-3 0275-2964;Working paper (Joint Center for Urban Studies) ; no. W84-3.

15 Dumont, Matthew P.. The absurd healer; perspectives of a community psychiatrist, by Matthew P. Dumont. New York, Science House [1968] 196 p. 22 cm.

one can be well paid. While I certainly believe that all workers should earn a living wage, the garbage workers in one California city make more than $60,000 a year while teachers rarely reach $40,000. This in one of the tightest and most expensive housing markets in the country. Enron and other corporations make billions[11] and pay no taxes.

Their decision makers cash out to huge wealth as their companies go under, robbing pension funds, small investors, and their own workers. To me this is greed. Those who have do not share. Those who don't have, carry the burden. I look at schools that ostensibly get the same amount of money per student, and see that the well-healed areas add massive subsidies. Greed is a value. I wonder how these values are related to a form of Calvinism, in which your human worthiness in God's eyes is believed to be measured by your wealth.

When profit is the primary goal of human endeavor, and this is allowed to define capitalism, my friend Trevor Hancock[16] objects. He says that capitalism means building economic, social, psychological, and environmental capital. Social entrepreneurship is not the process of doing good for profit. Rather, it is using skills toward social ends, and making a reasonable profit. Many of us can be called Social Entrepreneur[17]s as we start programs, mentor those starting out, and link people to each other, so they can move ahead.

There are too many people who are treated as though they were superfluous: un-needed, unwanted, and replaceable. Given a society where work is increasingly technical, the service jobs are for minimum wages. In order to subsist, people work two and three jobs, none really rewarding. People in these jobs are replaceable because there are always others eager to have any job they can get. They often can't make ends meet. Families are a paycheck away from homelessness. The New York Times reports that more than one million American children were homeless last year. The service jobs in hotels, restaurants, and other industries are often filled by undocumented workers, whom we hound and encourage at the same time. In Latin America, the squatters who come to the city take over vacant land. Even though they build it up, and create community structure and dignity, they have no legal protection and can lose their homes to the bulldozers at any time.

Children are dying and we lose part of our future. There are 200,000,000 children on the streets worldwide. We found this out when I was on a UNICEF taskforce in Florence, Italy to study the problem of urban children living in extreme circumstances. UNICEF reports that about 30,000 children die every day from hunger and diarrheal diseases. That means 11 million children suffer and die needlessly each year. Do we need children? Are they superfluous as well? We put so little into their development and

16 Hancock, Trevor, Healthy People in Healthy Communities, in a Healthy World, edited transcript of the Regent's Lecture at The University of California, Berkeley, September 27, 2000.

17 Duhl, Leonard, The Social Entrepreneurship of Change, , Cogent Press, 3 Miller Road, Putnam Valley, New York..

healthcare, and give only a privileged few a good education. Unlike Comenius[18], the 16th century philosopher, who believed children are seeds to be nourished, we act as if they are truly empty vessels to be filled. Then they, in turn, can fill all the technical jobs. The great educator Alexander Meiklejohn explores these two worldviews in a beautiful book that introduced me to Comenius[19]. The IQ test was originally created to see who deserves an education, to determine who can then work in industry. That's part of Massachusetts's history.

At the same time that these things are occurring there are many exciting developments.

Our understanding and uses of technology are increasing

- We are finding new renewable resources
- Our life span has increased markedly
- New multidisciplinary arrangements are being created for problem solving
- Respect and equality for women is increasing
- There is an increased awareness, acceptance, and occasionally appreciation of diversity in many communities.
- There is accelerated move to look at the basic question, "Why are we here?"
- Spirituality, as distinct from formal religion, is on a marked upswing
- There is an increasing demand for and active participation by all segments of society

Some Alternative Responses

What we are looking at here is the need to anticipate issues. It requires the building of skills to cope with ambiguity and change. We proceed from the acknowledgment that we live in a world where change is a given.

Learning to cope is a problem of building social and personal capital. For example, in Oakland, any of the 273 different language groups may thrive in its own healthy community, and at the same time have little ability to cope with the outside world. We saw in the West End study that large groups of displaced people who are grieving for a lost home[20] require the creation of new or expanded institutions, services, and programs to attempt to replace the destroyed social structure which previously had helped the people to cope. The choice is between *benign neglect* in the form of inadequate services

18, Comenius, Johann Amos, 1592-1670. The great didactic of John Amos Comenius /, now for the first time Englished with introductions, biographical and historical, by M. W. Keatinge., London : A. and C. Black, 1896. 468 p

19 Meiklejohn, Alexander, 1872-1964. Education between two worlds,, by Alexander Meiklejohn. New York, London, Harper & Brothers [1942] x, 303 p.

20 Fried Marc, "Grieving for a Lost Home" in Urban Condition, Leonard Duhl (ed) Basic Books, New York, 1963.

and the development of new types of services promoting community learning and the building of social capital.

Benign neglect has lead to homelessness. The causes and the human cost of homelessness as well as solutions are a good model for the multi sectoral nature of modern human problems. The New York Times Magazine[21] reports that currently between nine hundred thousand and one million four hundred thousand children become homeless in America every year. To put this number in perspective, it is estimated that one million five hundred Jewish children were slaughtered by Nazis during World War Two.

Our homeless children are not as visible as the homeless mentally ill who live on our streets. What would you guess is the proportion of families among the homeless of New York City? Seventy five per cent of New York's homeless seeking shelters are families with children. The Times reports that every night this winter in New York City, an average of thirteen thousand children spent the night attempting to eat, do homework, play, and sleep while being shuttled with their belongings between Service centers and temporary shelters. There were 23 per cent more children homeless than last year, while the numbers of single homeless people dropped in the city.

The children who experience homelessness are at extreme risk for mental illness. It is predictable that, as these children attempt to negotiate the developmental hurdles of adolescence and young adulthood, the consequences of homelessness will emerge as a national mental health nightmare. To begin to address the problems of these children and to avert their emotional suffering will require a national reordering of priorities, perhaps beginning with a national ethos that all of our children are our most precious resource and are our future. It seems incomprehensible that we do not treasure our children.

Programmatically, a coherent system of networked programs to provide permanent housing, economic support, job training for parents, entry level jobs with a living wage and a future, and high quality schools and after school care for the children would be a start. To begin to solve the problems of these extremely high-risk children and to prevent future morbidity, standard mental health services would seem to have a fairly low priority. But absent our becoming intensely active on their behalf, as many of these children grow up, the nation will be looking to overburdened mental health services as the most benign response, and to police and prisons as the most likely response to their problems. They will have become all too visible to ignore.

As long as these children remain invisible, those of us who are privileged to have a home do our best to keep this national shame out of consciousness. We try to ward off our feelings of guilt and culpability and our fears that this could be us. This, coupled with the resulting apathy, has lead to an increase in the attitudes of anger and repression, and

21 Egan, Jennifer, To be Young and Homelss, New York Times Magazine, Masrch 24,2000, pp32.

a clear notion that the undeserving poor are different from us and should get no help. I am particularly concerned about this, since worldwide the gap between rich and poor is growing logarithmically, and in many places we are ignoring the needs of the poor and the mentally ill. The main contribution of Freud was the show that they, the mentally ill, are also us.

We forget there are no boundaries. Illness, as well as economics crosses all borders. We are a global world and must be treated as a worldwide community. The continuing belief that some of us are superfluous people demands that we look at our values, at the meaning of work, and at responsibility. When we are forced to, we some provide services. Often these services are resurrected, failed programs from the past, mainly serving the agenda of perpetuating an entrenched bureaucracy. Or they are programs responding more to the needs of special interests than to those of the poor. We respond more to our perceptions of what is needed rather than attending to the perspective of those who would benefit. Our notion, still prevalent, is that we must deliver services. Only slowly are we finding that for anyone, active participation in our own care is critical. This is a new middle class phenomenon, starting with the self-help movement and vastly expanded as we actively access the web. It is less frequently true of the poor, unless they become active.

In the 1960's and 70's there was an upsurge in political activism in many groups: black, Hispanic, women, gays, and numerous other groups. Though diminished in the present, the WTC crisis may be bringing activism back. Community participation, the building of social capital is high on many agendas. In Afghanistan, we need a new Marshall Plan, not for the benefit of major corporations, but by using microeconomics, to develop social and economic skills at the local level.

I can only refer you to The Grameen Bank[17] in Bangladesh, and to Kerala, a state in India. In Kerala they discovered that a rising GNP is no replacement for group and community participation and social capital. In both instances active participation by the community resulted in major changes in the quality of life. Though Sri Lanka's GNP is the same as that of Bangladesh, the people in Sri Lanka enjoy a greater life expectancy than the people of Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, however, Mohamed Yunis began his micro-credit program, which now reaches millions. In the 21 years since it has been started the women receiving loans have been responsible for the building of 400,000 houses. Micro businesses, started because of support from his loan program, have developed into a large provider of insurance and the largest cellular provider in the country. This work is reminiscent of Erich's and Dick Poston's community organization efforts in India. There are many other examples of new services that are "out of the box." However, many do not deal with the major underling issues. Here we have to turn again to values.

Values and Where They Come From

If one goes back through time, values emerge from the perceptions we have of reality. As we created a map of our reality, it slowly becomes concretized. Early religious belief is related to coping with the unknown. Its earliest dimensions are ways to understand the un-understandable. Only later does this spirituality get converted to big "R" religions. At any given level of understanding there is a commonality of the deep spiritual traditions. As Erich tried to understand the loss of his mother, he entered a period of private yet deep involvement with some of the spiritual traditions in Germany. I can say that his loss, his grief, and his winter depressions led to his life work on grief work and crisis theory. An event, the Coconut Grove fire, a major crisis, formalized his work in these areas[22]. His seminal work led to new conceptualizations of traumatic loss and resulted in new interventions to mitigate lasting effects of loss. Such is the time we are in now. In the aftermath of 9/11, with our being suddenly attacked and the prospect of unending war, we are again in a time of crisis. We too must seize the opportunity to develop new concepts and interventions.

A New Tack—My Path to Healthy Cities

Our job is to search and question whether there needs to be a shift in our values. Must we continue with an economic model of development? Can we focus on the quality of life that people need? As a start, the UN Development Program has begun to shift its evaluation of countries from GNP and GDP measures to quality of life questions. What factors have the most impact on quality of life? Health, jobs, education, meaningful living, environment, housing and food are some that come immediately to mind.

What has this to do with spirituality, Erich, and mental health? First, let me say that from my discussions with Erich, late in his life, spirituality was one of his central concerns. He reminded me of his earlier interests in post-war Germany and the relationship of grief work to spirituality. In the 1960's there was a temporary upsurge in concern with mental health. The response was more money, more clinics, and the development of an *empire*. The effort ultimately failed. As we discussed in the Space Cadets, health was a holistic issue. Mental health could not be divorced from the total community and the environment. The Urban Condition[23] resulted from presentations by the Space Cadets at the American Orthopsychiatric Association. In the book, we took an ecological systems approach to health and to cities. It was an underground best seller in departments of City Planning. It was the beginning of a new understanding of the issues central to mental health.

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22 Lindemann, Erich, op cite

23 Duhl, Leonard, op cite

I took a divergent position at the NIMH[24], that mental health should be a small program, linked to interventions to improve the health and functioning of the total community, each intervention participating in contributing to patient and community needs. I lost the internal battle. Sadly, as community mental health failed in this country, and the ill ended up on the streets or in jail, our increasing shame contributed to less and less compassion for the ill and less interest in improving their lives.

I turned to other work, to the Peace Corps and its innovative mental health program, to poverty and the OEO, and to politics with Robert Kennedy. Ultimately I worked with the Department of Housing and Urban Development. As it became increasingly clear that all medical and psychiatric care accounts for only ten percent of the conditions necessary for people's health, I went to the City Planning program at Berkeley. At the same time, Matt Dumont tried to continue his work in community mental health[25]. I spent the next years absorbed with the City of Oakland, with alternative healing, with planning and development, and with international health. In 1983, I was fortunate to be invited by Trevor Hancock to Toronto to speak at an international meeting, called Beyond Health Care, to develop future Canadian health initiatives. At that meeting, I gave a paper on Healthy Cities, where I emphasized many of the points I have spoken of today[26]

- Cities are like human organisms, in that they encompass complex systems of intercommunicating subsystems.
- One cannot be healthy when the "liver" is sick.
- Equity is vital. Even the human body is not controlled from the top.
- There must be a functioning infrastructure to connect, hold together, and communicate.
- A functioning infrastructure includes both a physical and a social infrastructure.
- Active participation of all segments of the community is necessary.
- As issues arise, all parties must come to the table.
- One must begin with a simple, mutually agreed upon problem that is solvable.
- The problem chosen has to be something important to the community.
- The projects are less important than the learning process.
- This process may take many years, as it builds social and personal capital.
- Outsiders can only educate and bring information from elsewhere.
- Funds can be raised locally with grants or by the redirection of current budgets.
- A development of a loose pseudo-anarchical organization requires contacts and access.
- - Communication can be done through meetings, visits and by a website
- Communities are capable of helping other communities.

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24 Duhl, Leonard, The Future of Psychiatry: Communities in Action, Menninger Clinic Bulletin, Vol 62, No. 1 (Winter 1998)

25Dumont, Matthew, op cite

26"Healthy Cities: Promoting Health in the Urban Context" (with T. Hancock). A background working paper for a World Health Organization Healthy Cities Symposium, Lisbon, Portugal, April 1986.

- No communities are alike, therefore let a 1000 flowers bloom.

As you can easily see, this is not labeled as either a heath or mental health program. "Healthy Cities and Communities" was chosen as the name to emphasize this point. However, all too often a community turns to its health officer. 7500 programs exist worldwide. Numerous programs throughout the public health fields are using this framework. Sustainable development, housing, transportation, and environmental programs are working in a similar way[27].

Returning to the Afghan refugees, the World Trade Center tragedy, the subsequent Anthrax scare, and our state of war, the need for a strong health infrastructure is evident. Part of what has emerged is that resources beyond medical care are needed. At the World Trade Center site and throughout lower Manhattan, there was an immediate awareness of the public health threat from pollution from the rubble. Yet it took time to respond. Because of effective mental health efforts in previous disasters, such as the Loma Prieta Earthquake, support teams were rapidly assembled and brought in to counsel the survivors and rescue workers. Mental health issues rose to the forefront, with professionals of all kinds volunteering. The faith community became an important part of the response. Non-professionals from the community and from all over the country rushed to offer help and support. These activities also helped people to cope with their experience of lack of control and their feelings of helplessness and grief. San Francisco's early and enduring response to the AIDS crisis had similar elements and became a model for other community-wide crises.

In the refugee camps, the Healthy Cities model has provided a quite useful model for developing infrastructure and interventions. We are looking not at any one symptom of crisis, but at the total ecology of the systems involved.

Erich Lindemann's Legacy

- What does this say for our future?
- Erich Lindemann was a prophet not recognized
- Health is the community
- Everyone must be involved
- A new set of values and processes for decision making is evolving
- Revitalized and new religions are becoming increasingly involved in the dialogue
- The struggles between people divided by ethnic, racial, religious, and economic differences will continue
- We must play a leadership role in our communities
- "Politics is local " And we must get involved.

27 For a look at what Healthy cities now is, look at www.healthycommunities.org And www.healthycities.org. There are more than 7500 cities worldwide.

The Challenge

The key challenges ahead are to push the frontier and to question accepted ideas in good currency; to revel in diversity; to respect both the concrete, analytic, quantitative mind and the divergent, intuitive, qualitative mind. We must keep in mind Erich's broadly inclusive education, his experience in many settings, and the path he set for so many of us.

Discussion

David Satin:

I have a feeling everybody's been talking about terrorism and mental health, but you've been talking about it indirectly from different points of view. Why is- I realize there's been terrorism for a long time- why is there terrorism now, and why has it come to our attention more forcefully now, and what should we be doing about it? I'm asking you all to repeat yourselves and to repeat yourselves in a more pointed way. Why is there so much concern about terrorism now, and what should we, whoever we are, be doing about it?

Leonard Duhl:

The old western system has failed and we've got to find new answers and the top can't find the new answers, so-called terrorists may not know what they're doing specifically on everything, are trying to force us to go along with them.

Elizabeth Prodromou:

I found everything you said really intriguing, but your point at the end about, you know, authoring a new outcome to the story. One of the things that struck me there is that in the discussion about the causes and therefore the responses to terrorism that, and then your final remark on, you know, just wanting someone to listen. I don't think that, until now, there's been much of that. Talking about making it and choosing a new ending to the story requires that certain taboos are overcome, that there can be an authentic and truly free discussion, and that everyone has a voice in making a decision about the narration of the story. And I think in some senses that ruptures terrorism. I mean you mention Rwanda genocide in Rwanda, and so many other examples, are partly the result of this failure to allow for a truly plural discussion about what is the core of the story, and therefore a more kind of collective participation and devising a solutions that, instead of routing everyone back to the beginning, get us to go forward.

Leonard Duhl:

Let me just go back and let my brother talk about this because this is a story of family therapy. I saw a patient who couldn't do anything--she couldn't do her work, she she couldn't do anything and was having a very, very hard time that went on and on. And I knew something was not there, so I invited the family to come in and join us. The family came in and they said everything was fine, that 'We had a great family' and everything was great. And I listened to it for a while and finally I saw something in the mother and I said, 'Do you want to come see me yourself?' so she came. At that moment she told me, 'I've got a secret that I've never been able to tell anybody. My husband doesn't know, nobody knows this secret. In 1929 my brother was electrocuted for murder.'

That secret stayed in the family. And then I got them all together and they started to talk about the family. My god, the family was loaded with secrets- everybody had a secret. As this secret came out over the months a cousin who was sleeping with her father rebelled. Somebody else came and this whole system started to change based upon just working with the systems. Now, what it required was everybody talking to each other, first in the family, and then this family started to talk to everybody. And lo and behold, the world became very different. She's now finishing her doctorate now, and the parents are doing pretty well, and traveling and doing things they never did before.

But if you take that and turn it to the world scene, there are silences, there's this silence about what is an Islamic woman, there's a system that's there- very secret to each other. In my program at the School of Public Health, what I do turns out to be a secret to the rest of the School of Public Health. In fact, they don't know what the devil I do. All they know is that when they go to Europe somebody hugs them because they have a beard, and they say, 'Oh, Len Duhl, I've wanted to meet you for a long time.' All they know is I must be known someplace but they don't know anything about what, and I've tried to get them to sit down and have a discussion about what all of us are doing, and they won't do it. We can't get them to get together. That's our problem.

Shahla Haeri:

I think it's really very important to say, 'Why now?' That is the crux of the matter. Why now? Why is it that we, in this country, pay attention to terrorism now, whereas terrorism has always existed? And just if we look a few years back, outside of our own immediate reality, we realize Rwanda, Kosovo, Srebrenica, Middle East, Chechnya, and then further back in history, you see that it's always been there.

I was just thinking about Colombia and there are the issues that we don't think of as violence or as terrorism. I have a beautiful proverb, and I tried to see if I can communicate the sense of it to you. They say the shame, or the bad work, of the elite and the death of the poor people have no sound. That is to say, nobody pays attention to it. It is when this has happened to us in this part of the world where we say, 'Hey, wait a second, what has happened?' I think that's why it's so important to think about how the outcome can be different, how to think about the narrative, how to think about society. What I see as a problem here is a sense of 'Why now?' not really knowing how to go. We're not trying to understand what are some of the causes. Why do we get attacked so badly? Who would have imagined in their wildest imagination that something like that would happen?

Also I believe, you may not agree, I believe these wounds are all really good models for people to learn to be acculturated and to understand even but briefly, 'Why do they hate us?' I'll tell you. We were in a revolution in 1979 and Iranians have good reason to be angry at Americans. In 1953 a very democratically-elected government was overthrown by a CIA coup.

We look up to the U.S. That's why I came here in 1968- it was the land of the freedom, and everyone wanted to come here. Even now, after 1979, people still love America. It's not that they hate it now. Twice we had those options for a democratic election, and twice it was frustrated. You see, so we cannot just assume that something is different in this terrible, terrible tragedy. I think it is different in the sense of it made us conscious. As I said, you know, that's why I tried to do in my presentation, just to say, let's see how we can understand the other, and let's see how we can make a connection, and maybe then we can find out what to do about it. I think that it's important to really understand the causes of the problem, rather than using military force and you know, be the bully of the universe.

David Satin:

Is this bilateral? You're talking about the United States or the West not understanding the non-West.

Shahla Haeri:

I don't want to make the West as something monolithic, the way that some people may think of Islam. The West is very complex and diverse, and of course we hear different voices, but unfortunately you realize which voices dominate there. I think it's important to see the diversity of voices, or which voice gets the dominance.

David Satin:

Is there also a need for Islam and fundamentalism, and the "terrorists" to understand who they are attacking? Is that ignorance also?

Shahla Haeri:

Oh, no, absolutely, they have to understand that. I think what I tried to do in my brief presentation, and I hope it actually makes some sense at some point, is to say how diverse Islam is, so there's no one big thing as Islam. Fundamentalists can hold different shapes and colors. They are not the same thing. In fact you may find fundamentalists in Pakistan who are totally quiet and have nothing to do with military actions. Of course they have to understand the West. Part of the anger, in fact, is towards the old regimes that were displaced because they see the regime that they did not support as being supported by the most powerful nation on earth. Of course they have to understand.

Let me just tell you this: Every single act among themselves, in every prayer that you have to do five times a day, it begins with, 'In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful.' The merciful and the compassion is theirs and it is part of everyone's consciousness, everyone's psyche, so the majority of people don't support terrorism. It's horrifying for them, for everybody to see that. But then also remember Bin Laden is not a religious person, he's a political animal. He's a political animal, and he has been

supported, at some points, by the United States of America to fight against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

I've been to Pakistan, we traveled all over Pakistan, with houses of weapons everywhere- how did they get that? The infrastructure of that society is broken, there's constant fighting. I mean, just today there were all these people who were killed in Pakistan. Where do they get all that? So it is really important to understand the history. History is so very important, and unfortunately we don't learn from history.

Leonard Duhl:

Why do you think our government is less threatened by one of our own attacking us versus terrorism. I wonder why does the government in this country does not try to take out all the people by the same standards as the people we were attacking in other countries?

Shahla Haeri:

You tell me.

Leonard Duhl:

They were us.

Shahla Haeri:

I remember I thought, 'Oh my god,' and immediately everybody focuses on religion and the embarrassment was left to some of the major anchorpersons who neatly try to make all these insinuations about Muslims and all that. You must ask that question of yourself. You really have to ask yourself that question…Every time I go to Iran people tell me, 'What's happening to American kids?' Of course there, that news gets blown up out of proportion, and they really think that there is something tremendously wrong in America culture and as far as American kids concerned…The other day two young kids, young boys, killed this young Nigerian. So I really think you seriously have to ask hard questions of your government and yourselves.

Unknown Speaker:

I want open an hypothesis and that is that no person becomes a terrorist unless they can experience some kind of terror, that you all have heard there are many ways of saying that children do what they've learned. And I'd like to dip a little back as an outsider and suggest that the problem isn't Islam and it isn't government, but I think it isn't us and it isn't them. It is in fact everyone, and it's in everyone's family somewhere. Like Len says, there are secrets in his family, and there are secrets in all families worldwide. One of the big secrets in families worldwide is that children are, as Len has said, really superfluous, unnecessary, undervalued, or in fact, not valued at all. Quite

often within the family, and they are the first victims of terror. They are not the terrorists.

These things are later repeated in adult life on a grander scale, in a kind of political transfer, wherein people with the same levels of dissatisfaction and unhappiness with experience and I'm not suggesting that this justifies the actions at all, only that it might be worthwhile to have a hypothesis to reject in order to understand the problem with families. Because without families there are no people, and without people there is no terrorism, and somewhere we've got to get back to a tiny scale in order to understand grand scale.

Elizabeth Prodromou:

I don't have an immediate response to that, but I think one of the things for me that's very crucial is the notion of power relations, and, you know, it's in terms of the discussion about transference. And I think what for me is very important to consider is the way in which those who have power cut across national boundaries. I think the 9/11 debate has been very much framed in terms of America versus the rest of the world, when, in fact, for me that is not a very satisfying way of thinking about it. It's thinking about who are the people who wield power, who wield political power, and the people who wield military power? Who are the powerless? Who are the people who don't have economic power? They don't have voice, they don't have military might at their disposal. And that's why I think we begin to see these type of tendencies, where all of the powerful who cut across national boundaries, and all of the powerless or less powerful are beginning to sort of cut across national boundaries.

Unknown Speaker:

There's an organizing principle that you're raising, which is the same as a person placed in the family, and in families you find the kind of power issues that you talk about. The power has this pre-established reality, and I think that your point is well-taken. We used to have a remark that adolescents usually became the ones acting out of the family therapist, because they would act up and suddenly everybody has to come in and talk to somebody who is interested in hearing everybody. And so they were the ones who brought them in to get some help, by acting up and in large measure, the explosion, the rage, is also the means of moving the family into some new place to talk, hear what it's like, feel what it's like, know what's going on, and to be heard. That is terribly important.

But I don't hear anybody stopping and talking about Ireland. In northern Ireland people have got to be heard. I hear Senator Mitchell stopped and listened to everybody, doing the same thing over and over, basically that you've got to hear everybody out. And that's really a change in the political process in a family, the political process in the world, to listen to everybody, because suddenly everybody seems to have an equivalent in power. To be heard is to be powerful, and then that's really an important issue. We have

to look at the whole development of power in families and the whole development of power in individuals.

Shahla Haeri:

I'd like to add- I think that if we just extend the discussion of the powerful, going back to the point that was originally raised that who is most powerful? Who are the people who have power? In addition to those who have power politically, we should also think about the media and how they speak. You know, they become our voices, and effectively allow us to speak or shut us off…I mean that's what's coming out, but on the whole it seems to me that American media might be free, but is not unbiased.

And also, I know that the regime tries to…what's the word? Fractious, fractured…but the kinds of newspapers you can find there, and the way that information is communicated and all the editorials that are made about what's going on, it's incredible. They close up one newspaper and the next day another closes up. I mean people at my job, as soon as one closes another one comes up. So they're not connected with these big corporations where the news is coming down through the same people, so I think it's very important for us to really address these fundamental questions of who speaks and who listens.

Unknown Speaker:

Yeah, can I follow up on that too? I was writing as you were talking about the ways that we have a voice, and the media is certainly one way that we have a voice. But access to the media, number one, the ballot box is the way that we have a voice, through elections and the political process. Economic capacity is the way we have a voice, either to create our own voice by virtue of economic economy or to take retribution by virtue of economic action. And a finally, force, and this gets back to this whole question about power relations, and if we think about these conventional mechanisms for voicing our story, then we need to think about, are these options, media, ballot box, and economic power, the things we think about as collective dialogue activities, are these really equally available to all people?

I mean, certainly as an academic and in the wake of 9/11, it became immediately apparent to me that there were certain taboos that, at least for the moment, could not be discussed, and I felt a sense of political correctness emerge about how we could discuss the origins of these events and the implications of them, not only in terms of U.S. and other, but also in terms of within our own society here. Who are the people who have had a voice in terms of discussing these issues?

Unknown Speaker:

The same thing here in this country, it's the same thing in every country. You've got to know the system, you've got to know the people, and it's that sense of knowing people. One of the problems we have in this country is that we have developed a collection of

strangers, whereas in many of the countries it's a collection of families and family loyalty and that makes a tremendous amount of power.

Leonard Duhl:

May I make a last comment about a great academic, Mr. Eunice in Bangladesh. He actually went out and discovered that women weren't making any money even making baskets, and so he started a microcredit program. And the World Bank wouldn't give him any money, nobody would give him any money, but he persisted and now there are about four million people covered by microcredit. But in addition to that, his group, the Grameen Bank, now is the largest cellular phone company in Bangladesh. It also is an insurance company that will cover the poor, and they are increasingly having a voice. Again, it's mostly women and these women are beginning to have a major political voice in Bangladesh.

There's another academic in Sri Lanka, Ariadne, who decided that he was going to start working with community after community, and he in fact is the only person in Sri Lanka who can talk to everybody on all sides. And when he did it so well and listened to them so well that when the president forbid him to take a peace walk, suddenly there was a ghost peace walk taking place: he didn't go, but where he was going to go they had the event every single day all over the island, which suggests that communication is very powerful. But also the fact is that he could talk to everybody was really central, and in many ways they are not talking about that in the papers, but in Sri Lanka that is the movement that really talked to all sides.

Unknown Speaker:

You raised a question about what voices can be heard, and Len, you talked about crisis and opportunity, and one of the things that I think causes these things to happen right now, rather than later or earlier, has to do with a number of completely disempowered people and this is a worldwide phenomenon. Now, we've heard that 'freedom' is just a word for nothing left to lose. That's a voice, and a huge number of people who now feel that they've nothing left to lose. It may not be their freedom they want, it may be a chance to scream. One of my sickest patients as a child had been very badly battered and raped, and the way he screamed was with the only thing that he could afford, which was a kitchen knife, and he sethouses on fire as a child.

The third or fourth day after 9/11 I started routinely asking my patients how they felt about this, if it had impacted their lives in any way? And three of the most brutalized men said something like…well I'll tell you what they said actually. One of them said, 'It doesn't matter.' I said, 'What do you mean, it doesn't matter?' 'It doesn't make any difference.' 'What do you mean, it doesn't make any difference?"Oh, maybe it's a good thing. Now everybody knows how miserable I feel.' People who are miserable tend to personalize the misery that they see elsewhere in the media, or elsewhere and identify with the victims.

Shahla Haeri:

I think another point in terms of the question you asked, 'Why now?' and I think it's important to understand the role of domination and how domination stifles other voices. It is in a sense of ideological, in the sense of being dominated by certain ideas, by certain ways of thinking, that then they respond politically or physically- poverty or the abuse in a physical sense, but it was the violence and domination that is also symbolic. Again it's not to justify a horrible act, but I'm just saying in terms of relating it to ideas of making one's voice heard or being the victim of abuse and how to rationalize your behavior. That's why I say brutalization has taken many forms. In this country, we can see it also in the form of domination.

What's interesting anthropologically speaking. One of the harshest things, the most physical things for kids to accept…We talked about in Africa, is to be weaned from their mother's back, because their mother carried them on their back and they feel high up there. So when they put them down there, they just get so upset. So as I just said, it just depends whether you're up or down.

David Satin:

I think we've pointed out all of the contributions, or many of the contributions to terrorism. I don't think these are competing, I don't think these are alternative approaches that the interpersonal influences can also be social influences that teach people what to expect and teach people what their responses can be. There can be economic, there can be many, many forms. I guess my thought about why now is that perhaps it's a false observation. Maybe there isn't more now, maybe it's more easily observed and more broadly communicated that this is happening. When it happened in a little village that took six months to get news out, it's different from when it happens in front of a TV camera and goes over to hundreds of millions of people elsewhere.

Maybe it's also of greater importance because it happened to this country, so this country has been gored, our ox has been gored, and therefore we are crying out more loudly. Maybe there is more interrelationship within the world so that the anguish in one place gets acted out in another place, and there are places in a very broad geographical area can respond for their various own reasons. So maybe it isn't more, maybe it's just more noticeable and it is the epidemic spreads faster, but also the cure spreads faster. We have an opportunity to go toward a world community and not just a village or even a country community.

Leonard Duhl:

I just want to not let us end with all the terrorism and horror, but also know there's been a hell of a lot of good things going on around the world.

David Satin:

Thank you very much for educating us at this stimulating discussion, and I hope people will join us again next year for the 26th Annual Lindemann Memorial Lecture. Thanks for coming.